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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis sought to examine the challenges in upholding the core humanitarian principles of 
humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence. Abiding by these principles 
is considered an essential component of humanitarian response. The principles provide a code 
of conduct for actors. They also serve a pragmatic function; they legitimize intervention in 
disasters by distinguishing humanitarians from actors with political affiliations. The 
conundrum is that the principles were designed to secure a “Humanitarian Space” that is 
apolitical, yet they must be applied in a political context.  
 
Focusing on the response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the thesis inquires into the 
limitations inherent in the principles and explores the motives that drive the humanitarian 
agenda in the country. Original questionnaire interviews were conducted on 40 United 
Nations employees directly involved in relief work in Haiti. The study focuses on the 
humanitarian operations during the first year after the earthquake. 
 
The author concludes that the humanitarian principles cannot be practiced as preached. The 
research proved that, while UN agencies want to alleviate human suffering, they also want to 
advance their institutional ambitions and will therefore abide by the principles when it is in 
their best interest to do so. Humanitarians walk a tight rope of multiple -- and often 
conflicting -- accountabilities to donors, organizational interests, recipients and public 
opinion. Confronted by the dilemmas inevitable in emergencies, there are too few incentives 
to uphold the humanitarian principles, yet too many disincentives.  
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PREFACE 
 
 	  
Since 2009, I have served as a humanitarian worker for the United Nations. First, I 
joined the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When 
an earthquake hit Haiti in 2010, I was part of the staff brought in to reinforce the UN 
response in the country. During the course of my work in both these missions, I became 
preoccupied with the question of how closely intertwined politics and humanitarianism 
were. Was the alleviation of human suffering really neutral, impartial and independent? 
The seeds for the genesis for this thesis were planted.  
 
Living in a high profile emergency environment, I did not have to satisfy myself with 
conclusions drawn in books. In dialogues I began to have with Professor Schütz-Müller, 
he encouraged me to investigate the situation on the ground.  In our long distance 
conversations between Port-au-Prince and Vienna, he prompted me to seek answers 
from aid workers in the forefront of the international response to one of the worst 
disasters in recent memory. This thesis is the outcome of that research. I am grateful to 
all the participants who so openly shared their insights. I hope this thesis, an honest 
examination of the work to which I have dedicated my life, adds value to a better 
understanding of some of the dilemmas that humanitarian workers face. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“There are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems.”1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees 	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1.1 Overview 
 
Haiti consistently ranks as the poorest country in the western hemisphere. The country    
suffers limited public administration capacities, vulnerability to political instability and food 
insecurity. Despite its numerous challenges, Haiti had made strides towards economic 
development and stability since 2004.   
 
The January 2010 earthquake that hit Port-au-Prince and surrounding cities compounded the 
fragile developmental and humanitarian situation.  The disaster also created new obstacles. 
Over 220 000 people died and more than a quarter of a million more were displaced. The 
earthquake destroyed or damaged infrastructure and public institutions necessary for social 
welfare, development and security.  
 
In the disaster’s wake, humanitarian and development organizations poured into Haiti, 
adding to a significant prior existence of similar entities. The United Nations, as the 
premier multi-lateral world body, buttressed its presence. The stabilization mission, 
MINUSTAH, and 16 agencies, funds and programmes (jointly known as the UN 
System) undertook a major humanitarian relief effort and expanded its field presence. 	  
 
These efforts, however, were often fragmented and inefficient, resulting in duplication 
and operational ineffectiveness. Never has it been more urgent, with the global 
economic crisis and shrinking budgets, for the UN System to ensure a coherent delivery 
of services focused on results, efficiency and accountability. Despite the incentives to 
do away with redundancy and reduce transaction costs, cooperation is often hindered by 
competition for funding, protection of territory and conflicting policies. 	  
 
The catastrophe in Haiti provides an excellent opportunity to assess the strengths and 
limits of the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and 
operational independence. Confronted by the donor pressure, organizational interests, 
the breakdown of infrastructure and any semblance of normality, unleashed by disasters 
of massive proportions, the cracks in the core humanitarian ethos start to show. This 
thesis seeks to examine the major dilemmas that confront humanitarian actors and how 
these dilemmas tarnish the integrity of the four codes of conduct.	  
 
	   9	  
1.2 Rationale 
 
This study comes at a time when humanitarian organizations find themselves facing an 
existential crisis. Confronted with a global economic meltdown, compounded by 
unprecedented disasters (due to climate change and other forces), humanitarianism is 
under pressure. Donor countries are cutting down on their own domestic budgets, while 
demanding that multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, tighten their belts. 
This pressure to do more work with fewer resources is redefining the humanitarian 
arena. The notion of humanitarians as saviours of the less fortunate is fast changing. 
The saviours are now forced to fight for their own survival.	  
 
In this environment of uncertainty, it is critical to understand how the founding principles of 
humanitarianism are being impacted. What becomes of this noble ethos as humanitarian 
actors are forced to make difficult decisions? If organizations are expected to first serve the 
needs of the poor, but they are now seen as primarily existing to fight for their own survival, 
what does this mean for the credibility of the institution? 
 
It is therefore important to study the relevance of the principles in this era of financial 
constraints and multiple humanitarian crises.  Humanitarian workers need to understand 
how the landscape has changed and in turn its guiding principles, and whether these 
principles are still relevant. This will help to either adjust the principles to the new 
reality, or to reconsider how they are employed on the ground. Rethinking the value of 
humanitarian principles is necessary for rendering humanitarian assistance more 
efficiently and credibly in the future.	  
 
Original research in Haiti will contribute valuable new insights into how the UN 
responded to one of the biggest disasters in recent history. What were the shortcomings 
of the response? What can be done in the future to avoid the same mistakes? Overall, 
this thesis will make a significant contribution by examining the firsthand testimony of 
humanitarian workers who are right in the middle of responding to a high-profile crisis. 
Understanding the perspectives of the custodians of the humanitarian principles and the 
challenges they face in their work will help to find appropriate solutions to addressing 
major shortcomings in aid efforts.	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1.3 Scope of Research 
 
This thesis seeks to examine the challenges in upholding the core humanitarian principles 
when responding to disasters. The study focuses on the humanitarian response to the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti. The country was chosen because it is one of the gravest humanitarian 
disasters in recent history. Haiti is also ideal because the researcher, at the time of writing, 
worked for the UN in the country and could therefor conduct first hand research. The review 
will restrict itself to the first year following the earthquake. 
 
While recognizing that there are many organizations operating in Haiti, this research will 
solely focus on the UN, as it is the premier multilateral actor in the country. The UN in Haiti 
is comprised of a peacekeeping and stabilization mission known as MINUSTAH and 16 
specialized agencies, working on a range of social, economic and political issues. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
 
The central research questions of this paper are: 
 
1. While noble in theory, in practice are there limitations to the core humanitarian 
principles? 
 
2. Are the UN humanitarian agencies motivated purely by the desire to prevent and 
alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found? 
 
3. In assisting people affected by disasters or crises, do UN agencies remain neutral, 
impartial and independent at all times? 
 
 
1.5 Hypotheses 
 
Based on the research questions, this paper’s hypotheses are: 
 
1. If the humanitarian principles are too idealistic, then UN agencies will face 
considerable limitations practicing them. 
 
2. If UN agencies seek to alleviate human suffering, then they are more likely to do 
so when this also advances their self-interest. 
 
3. If UN agencies remain neutral, impartial and independent, then they do so only 
when feasible and strategic. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“It’s been a year that we live in this tent. All these people in Haiti to help us and still we live 
here like animals. More questions? What are you going to do for my family?”2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2Interview with Haitian man living in Carradeux camp, Port-au-Prince 	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2.1 Design and Content 
 
A questionnaire field survey was conducted with UN humanitarian workers based in 
Haiti. The survey questions targeted the central themes of the thesis: challenges inherent 
in the humanitarian principles; successes and failures of the UN response; and key 
factors that drive the humanitarian agenda.	  
 
The majority of the questions were open-ended to benefit from in-depth answers, while 
not limiting the responses. The open-ended method was chosen to allow a full 
expression of the participants’ opinions, rather than forcing them to select an answer 
from a pre-determined set of responses. Respondents could offer their true perspective, 
without being steered in a pre-determined direction.	  
 
Please see original questionnaire attached in Appendix I 
 
 
2.2 Questionnaire Construction 
 
The literature review provided an overview of the main challenges humanitarian agencies 
face in relief operations. Based on insights from the literature review, an unstructured 
discussion was carried out with five UN staff members in order to determine the major 
concerns and issues they face in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Haiti. Information 
obtained from the discussion, as well as the literature review, was used to construct the first 
draft of the structured questionnaire. 
 
This set of questions was then piloted on five different employees to evaluate clarity 
and viability. A few alterations were subsequently made. Though Haiti is a           
French-speaking country, the questionnaire was in English to ensure consistency. This 
did not pose any problems as UN employees have at minimum a working command of 
the language.	  
 
 
 
 
	  14	  
2.3 Procedure 
 
To obtain the highest information pay-off, the questionnaires were answered 
anonymously through an electronic system. This method allowed the participants to 
speak honestly, without fearing for the security of their jobs when answering sensitive 
questions that require evaluating the performance of the UN response in Haiti.	  
 
Informed consent was sought from participants after they were identified as meeting the 
criteria (please see participants section below for profile requirements). Full explanation 
of the project was given to them. Participants were told not to feel pressured to answer 
any questions with which they were not comfortable. They were assured their identities 
would be kept anonymous.	  	  	  
2.4 Participants 
 
Forty UN employees directly involved in implementing relief work were interviewed. They 
were therefore able to speak to the issues under consideration with expertise. Given the 
study’s focus on the relief operations during the first year after the earthquake, participants 
had to meet the condition that they were present during that period. 
 
The participants were sampled to ensure an equal representation of all the 16 UN agencies 
and the civil component of the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH, present in post-
earthquake Haiti. This covered the full spectrum of the work the UN is undertaking in Haiti, 
from reconstruction and relocation, peacekeeping to basic needs, such as health and nutrition. 
 
In total, 50 questionnaires were sent out; all potential people approached agreed to 
participate in the survey. Of these, 43 people responded. This translates to an 86-percent 
response rate, which is considered a very good outcome for surveys of this nature that 
required careful thought. In the final analysis, three questionnaires were discarded 
because of too many incomplete answers.	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2.5 Data Analysis 
 
A qualitative data analysis was carried out to identify patterns in the answers given by 
respondents. Answers to each question were analyzed to identify common themes, which 
were then categorized. The grouping allowed for identification of main trends. 
 
The following steps were taken in analyzing the data: 
 
1. Review of all responses to get a sense of the overall answers given. This helped to get 
a feeling for the data and to make preliminary observations of common themes. 
  
2. For each individual question, categories were created for similar themes in the 
participants’ answers. Noteworthy exceptions to trends were also acknowledged. 
  
3. Each response, by question, was assigned at least one category (data coding). In some 
cases participants gave more than one response. 
  
4. The coded data was then double checked for errors. When errors where found, they 
were corrected. A few categories that were repetitious were eliminated. 
  
5. The final step was to closely examine the categories, across all questions, in order to 
identify major trends and patterns in the responses. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Humanitarian Governance may have its heart in the right place, but it is still a form of 
governance, and governance always includes power.”3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Barnett, Michael, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, New York: Cornell University Press, 
2011, p .12 	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3.1 Overview 
 
Humanitarianism has transformed into a field of global governance by becoming increasingly 
public, hierarchical and institutionalized.4 Institutionalism is the most suitable theory to 
explain the workings of international organizations, such as the UN. Specifically, the  
neo-realist approach to the international regime theory best supports the hypotheses for this 
paper.5 The international regime theory emerged as part of the theory of international 
institutionalism. This chapter will examine the political science theories that help shed light 
on the workings of humanitarianism. 
 
 
3.2 Institutionalism 
Immanuel Kant was among the first philosophers to theorize about institutionalism. In his 
essay, “Perpetual Peace”, he tackled the idea that peace might be established through the 
creation of a trans-European federation.6  Traditional institutionalists define institutions as 
formal or informal procedures, routines, conventions and norms integrated into the structure 
of the political economy or polity. They generally see them as organizations.7  
States are inclined to join institutions when they expect these to fulfill important functions 
from which they will ultimately benefit.8 Members of institutions follow their rules, because 
they believe them to be appropriate and legitimate.9 In the 1950’s, historical institutionalism 
evolved into new institutionalism.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Rivas, Darlene, “Humanitarian Intervention and Relief,” in: DeConde, Alexander/ Dean Burns, Richard/ 
Logevall, Fredrik Charles (eds.): Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, Volume 2. New York: 
Scribner’s Sons, 2002, p. 151,  5	  Peters, Guy, Institutional theory and political science, New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2005, 
p. 19-21.	  
6 Kant, Immanuel, “A Philosophical Sketch,” in: Reiss, Hans, (ed.): Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, p 93- 130 
7 Thelen, Kahleen/ Steinmo, Sven, Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. 
New York: Cambridge University Press1992, p. 2-3  
8 Jönsson, C./Tallberg, J. Institutional Theory in International Relations. In J. Pierre, B. G. Peters and. 
Stoker (eds) Debating Institutionalism, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008, p. 118 
9 March, James G./Olsen Johan P., The Logic of Appropriateness, University of Oslo: Arena Centre for 
European Studies, 2009, p.1  
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New Institutionalism is based on different strands:10 
• Normative institutionalism, which claims that the behavior of members is defined by 
norms and values of the institution. 
• Rational Choice Institutionalism, which sees state’s behavior as defined by rules and 
regulations. 
• Historical Institutionalism, which builds on the concept of “path dependency”, 
claiming early policy choices in specific domains affect future decisions. 
• International Institutionalism, the foundation of the international regimes theory. 11 
Keohane, a representative of the neo institutional school, argues that members of institutions 
mainly benefit from the reduction of transaction costs and the fact that institutions make it 
easier to exercise influence on other states.12  This mutual influence can contribute to creating 
peace and stability. Nation states, interlinked in the framework of an institution are able to 
engage in relationships of trust, minimizing risks for conflicts and facilitating the solving of 
shared problems.13 
Humanitarianism as an idea is based on the alleviation of shared problems in the world, 
and a sense of global solidarity. Scholars argue that humanitarian action has become 
more and more institutionalized.14 It is defined by providing aid across national 
borders.15 To be able to do that it requires an international mechanism, in other words 
an international community with shared values standards and interests. Fassin 
summarizes this system as an international humanitarian government.16  
Some authors, such as David Rieff, claim that there is no such thing as an international 
community and therefore no unbiased humanitarianism; individual self-interest is always 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Peters, Guy, Institutional theory and political science, New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2005, 
p. 19-21.	  
11 ibid 
12 Keohane, Robert, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory. 
Boulder: Westview, 1989, p. 150-155. 
13 Keohane, Robert/Martin, Lisa, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” in: International Security, Vol. 
20. No.1. MIT Press, 1995, p. 49-50  
14 Walker, Peter/Maxwell Daniel, Shaping the Humanitarian World, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 73 
15	  Barnett, Michael, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2011, p.21 
16Fassin, Didier, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present, Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2012, p. 1-7 
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present. The lack of shared values among the countries of the world stands in direct 
opposition, to the idea of a community of states, striving for the same goals.17 
 
Franck supports Rieff’s point when he describes the idea of an international community as 
“traces of community in a world of nations”18 and as a “metaphorical negotiation of 
representatives of governments”19, who secretly meet to discuss how to best justify non-
intervention in humanitarian crises. 
 
Hart is more specific in his criticism, comparing the international community to a primitive 
society lacking a judicial system to challenge the sets of customary rules it is based on: “The 
rules for states resemble that simple form of social structure, consisting only of primary rules 
of obligation, which when we find it among societies of individuals we are accustomed to 
contrast with a developed legal system.”20 
 
Even those who have dedicated their lives to institutes that advance the ideals of an 
international community, the UN, question its effectiveness. Brian Urquhart, former head of 
the Department of Political Affairs, echoes views of a lawless community. He once said: “If 
there is a world community, then who is the sheriff?”21 
The theory of institutionalism also claims that, while states can profit from cooperation, each 
member has the right to self-determination and.22 This suggests that individual concerns will 
always over-ride the greater good.  
Some scholars argue that members will follow the rules of institutions because deviation will 
make them worse off than compliance.23 Members are also reluctant to change the given rules 
to their immediate advantage, because they do not know what impact their changing of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Rieff, David A bed for the Night, Humanitarianism in Crisis, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002, p. 
8	  
18 Franck, Thomas M., The power of legitimacy among nations, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990, p. 182	  
19 Franck, Thomas M., The power of legitimacy among nations, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990, p.182	  
20 Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, 10th impression, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 209 
21 As quoted in: Rieff, David A bed for the Night, Humanitarianism in Crisis, New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2002, p9	  
22 Gareis, Sven B./Varwick, Johannes, Die Vereinten Nationen: Aufgaben, Instrumente und Reformen, 
Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2007, p. 62-63. 
23 Calvert, Randall L., The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions, in: Banks, Jeffrey S./Hanushek, 
Eric A., (eds.) Modern Political Economoy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 216-266 
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rules could have on future decisions.24 In the case of the UN, member states generally follow 
decisions taken by the Security Council. As the most powerful organ of the UN, it decides 
over crucial issues, such as humanitarian interventions.  
Humanitarianism depends on the institute of the international community to provide it with 
the framework to operate in. However, scholars argue that humanitarianism has turned into an 
institution itself-- a humanitarian government. For Fassin, the humanitarian government is, 
“the administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle, that sees 
the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action”.25  
Barnett adds that it was born through, “a cosmopolis of morally minded militias supported by 
international law, norms and institutions that reach out to suffering strangers around the 
world”. He argues that the concept of humanitarian governance is problematic due to its 
various approaches to alleviating suffering.26  
 
A growing amount of stakeholders, with different ambitions make relief work highly 
political. Some stakeholders try to use aid as a proxy, to camouflage their political ambitions 
in certain regions of the world. In addition, it is the members themselves who decide how 
much power they are willing to cede in favor of an institution’s legitimacy.27 Against this 
backdrop, the neo realist approach to international regime theory seems best suited to 
describe the institution of the humanitarian government.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Shepsle, Kenneth A., Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions, in: Weisberg, Herbert 
(ed.): Political Science: the Science of Politics, New York: Agathon, 1986, p. 51-81 
25 Walters, William, Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border, in: 
Broeckling U./Krasmann, S./ Lemke T. (eds.), Governmentality: current issues and future challenges, 
New York: Routledge, 2011, p143,144 
26 Barnett, Michael, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2011, p. 220-221	  27	  March, James G./Olsen Johan P., The Logic of Appropriateness, University of Oslo: Arena Centre for 
European Studies, 2009, p.1  
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3.3 International Regime Theory 
The international regime theory has its roots in the neo realist branch of international 
institutionalism.28 Stephen Krasner defines international regimes as “principles, norms,      
rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given     
issue-area.”29 His definition has become one of the most often citied for the international 
regime theory.30 
Regimes are widely regarded as “social institutions governing the actions of those involved in 
specifiable activities or sets of activities.”31 International regimes can either be formal or 
informal. They can appear in the form of international organizations, legal conventions or 
treaties. Hartmann states that international regimes are comparable to an international society. 
Their primary objective is to unite states in cooperation toward specific goals, with all 
members abiding by a fixed set of rules.32  
Joennsen and Tallberg argue that the significance of a regime depends on its robustness and 
effectiveness; determined by the extent to which its members abide by the rules and norms. 
Robustness is also demonstrated by the resistance of international institutions in the face of 
external challenges and the extent to which their objectives are achieved.33 Scholars mainly 
identify three thought schools for international regime theory. 
	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28Peters, Guy, Institutional theory and political science, New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2005, 
p. 19-21. 
29 Krasner, Stephen, D.  “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” in: Krasner Stephen (ed.) International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 2	  
30 Jönsson, C./Tallberg, J. Institutional Theory in International Relations. In J. Pierre, B. G. Peters and. 
Stoker (eds) Debating Institutionalism, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008, p. 125 
31 Young, Oran A., International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the 
Environment, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 12 
32Hartmann, Jürgen, Internationale Beziehungen, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2001, p. 55.  33	  Jönsson, C./Tallberg, J. Institutional Theory in International Relations. In J. Pierre, B. G. Peters and. 
Stoker (eds) Debating Institutionalism, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008, p. 125 
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Table 1:  
 
Schools of Thought in the study of International Regimes:34 	  
 REALISM NEOLIBERALISM COGNITIVISM 
Central Variable Power Interest Knowledge 
“Institutionalism” Weak Medium Strong 
Meta-theoretical 
orientation 
Rationalistic Rationalistic Sociological 
Behavioral Model Concerned with relative gains 
Absolute gains    
maximizer 
Role-player 	  	  
 
3.4 Neo-Realism and the Humanitarian Government 
 
Only the neo-realist approach will be examined in this thesis. Neo-Realism or Structural 
Realism is a theory outlined by Kenneth Waltz. It is based on the idea, that the international 
system is anarchic and each state pursues its personal gain. However, states do ally 
themselves with others, recognizing that certain goals are easier to achieve together. 35   
Neo-Realism builds on the assumption that certain power relationships between states create 
stability or instability.  
 
The theory sees three different power balance structures in the international system: a 
hegemonic system with only one great power, a bipolar system with the power shared 
between two states and a multipolar system with more than two great powers.	  	  	  
For neo-realists, only	  the balance of power between two dominating states in an international 
system, promises to secure peace.36	  
 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Source: Hasenclever Andreas/Mayer Peter/ Rittberger Volker, Theories of International Regimes, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 6. 
35 Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishers Co.,1979, p.8-15. 
36Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics,	  New	  York: Addison-Wesley Publishers Co.,1979, p. 
132-133 
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States and aid organizations demonstrate neo-realist behavior when they engage in relief 
work. Humanitarian governance cannot function outside the established socio-economic rules 
of the world. It is contingent upon the pragmatic political mechanisms of the existing 
international community. The hypotheses for this thesis suggest that the UN, when engaging 
in humanitarian action, is not always motivated by alleviating human suffering wherever it 
may be found. It gives preference to some crises and neglects others.  
 
The functioning of the Security Council, the UN’s most powerful organ, explains part of this 
problem. The Security Council is ruled by the five permanent member states that have veto 
power.37 Five members – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China -- 
are not representative of the entire international community. They are heavily western. 
Decisions taken ultimately favour the most powerful governments and the veto power has 
been used to protect their allies.  
 
Neo-realist behavior is also traceable in the actions of aid agencies and bilateral donors.     
Aid agencies increasingly jeopardize the rules of engagement by politicizing aid. They curve 
in to political pressure for their own survival, and at the expense of alleviation of suffering.38 
Donors can pressure agencies to focus on specific crises, or even regions, to the detriment of 
others.39 This departure from the neutral, impartial and independent view of humanitarian 
assistance, gives more room to the interests of the powerful. Agencies in turn demonstrate 
neo-realist behavior when they compete against each other in pursuit of personal gain, 
cooperating only when it is easier and to their ultimate benefit. 40, 41   
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37Krasno,J./Mitushi D., “The Uniting for Peace resolution and other ways of circumventing the authority 
of the Security Council,” in: Cronin, Bruce, Hurd, Ian (eds.) The UN Security Council and the politics of 
international authority, New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 175 38	  OCHA, Thematic Areas, Humanitarian Engagement, United Nations Integrated Presence, Operating in 
Complex Security Environments, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/thematic-
areas/humanitarian-engagement [last accessed 2 January 2012]	  
39 Smillie, Ian, Minear, Larry, The Charity of Nations: Humanitarianism in a calculating world, New 
York: Kumarian Press, 2004, p. 136 
40 Wakolbinger, Tina B./Toyasaki Fuminori, “Impacts of funding systems on humanitarian operations,” 
in: Christopher/Tathemeds, Humanitarian Logistics: Meeting the Challenge of Preparing for and 
responding to Disasters, Kogan Page Publishers, 2011 p. 3 
41 Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishers Co., 1979, p.8-15. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
EXAMINATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“To promote visibility you don’t see the human being anymore. The only                   
motivating principle that’s left is the goal of the organization.”42  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Participant in survey, UN humanitarian worker 	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4.1 Definition of Humanitarianism 
 
The instinct to help someone in need is as old as humanity itself. Humanitarianism 
distinguishes itself through its being organized. Barnett asserts that three main characteristics 
distinguish humanitarianism from general acts of charity: that it is organized, part of 
governance and directed to people living in countries other than one’s own.43 A number of 
authors concur that for aid to be termed “humanitarianism”, it must transcend national 
borders. A father who assists his sick child or a government its people in need cannot be 
defined as humanitarianism. This is their expected responsibility. 
 
Barnett further defines humanitarianism as the institutionalization of the concept of helping 
one another as human beings. This institutionalized system provides states and international 
organizations a framework through which to provide aid to those in need. Didier Fassin calls 
this a humanitarian government.44 Later in the thesis we will examine how humanitarianism, 
like any other form of government is shrouded by power dynamics despite having its heart in 
the right place. Maxwell and Walker call this a “people-to-people structure with governments, 
agencies and aid organizations as the go-betweens.”45 
 
In the aid business, there is a term commonly referred to as “Humanitarian Space”.46 This 
term is synonymous with access. It refers to an apolitical space that is accorded to 
humanitarian agencies to their work without interference from belligerent parties. 
This space is accorded because of the noble ideal of humanitarianism. The most basic 
characteristic of humanitarianism is that it seeks to alleviate human suffering wherever it may 
be found. This is at the heart of what defines humanitarianism. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Barnett, Michael, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2011, p21 
44Fassin, Didier, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present, Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2012, p 1-7 
45Walker, Peter/Maxwell Daniel, Shaping the Humanitarian World, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 2 
46 Leader, Nicholas, The Politics of Principle: “The principles of humanitarian action in practice,“ 
Humanitarian Policy Group Report, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000, p.8  
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4.2 History of Humanitarianism 
 
There were many forms of people assisting each other, long before humanitarianism was 
formalized.47 Religious believes were a critical factor in the proliferation of the idea to help 
fellow human beings. Religion continues to influence humanitarianism today.48 
 
Scholars agree that the first institutionalization of humanitarianism was the establishment, in 
1863, of the International Confederation of the Red Cross.49 The organization has its roots in 
the inspiration of Henry Dunant who in 1859 witnessed a battle between the French and 
Austro-Hungarian troops in the Italian town of Solferino.50 Shocked by the plight of the 
wounded soldiers left behind on the battlefield, he joined the local population to provide 
relief, laying the foundation for the Red Cross.51 
 
Following the Red Cross, the end of the first world war spun the first of many international 
aid organizations; the High Commission for Refugees and the International Relief Union 
among them. During the Second World War, governments and private relief organizations 
further expanded relief work across Europe.52 After the Second World War, the new        
socio-political context of decolonization expanded the humanitarian idea beyond the frontiers 
of Europe, into Africa. Humanitarian agencies originally created for relief and reconstruction 
in Europe now saw themselves as global relief organizations.53  
 
This expansion of humanitarianism led to a need to try to define the rules of engagement in 
international efforts to alleviate human suffering. The Red Cross, in 1965, came up with a set 
of principles to codify humanitarian action. This was the birth of the now universally 
accepted principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47Ferris, Elizabeth,“Faith-based and secular humanitarian organizations,“ International Review of the Red 
Cross, Volume 87, Number 858, 2005, p. 311-312 
48 Snyder, Jack, Religion and International Relations Theory, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2011, p. 96-99 
49 Oberleitner, G, Global Human Rights Institutions: Between Remedy and Ritual, Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 2007 p24, 25 
50Walker, Peter/Maxwell Daniel, Shaping the Humanitarian World, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 22 
51Barnett, Michael, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2011, p.1 
52 Macalister-Smith, Peter, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International 
Law and Organization, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985, p. 17-21/ 35-36 
53Macalister-Smith, Peter, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International 
Law and Organization, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985, p. 35-66	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Authors, such as Leader, argue that what is now commonly referred to as humanitarian 
principles, were in fact conditions imposed on humanitarian agencies by belligerent parties. 
These conditions were imposed in exchange for access to wounded soldiers and other people 
in need of help, as long as they did not interfere in the conflict.54 Today humanitarian actors 
utilize these principles to self-police. 
 
The historical period determines how humanitarianism is applied. Three distinct eras are seen 
as key in the evolvement of humanitarianism: The post-colonial era, the end of the cold war 
and the advent of globalization.55 With the end of the cold war, the new wars of the 1990s 
created more complex, often conflict related humanitarian crises, that were now covered by 
24-hour news agencies, transporting shocking real time images right into the world’s living 
rooms.56 These changes called for new forms of humanitarianism. 
 
Traditional humanitarianism focused purely on providing relief to immediate suffering. Over 
time, many actors grew discontent with this narrow interpretation and added the ambition to 
address the root causes of the human suffering.57 These two dominant branches of 
humanitarianism have different understandings of the meaning of humanitarianism and its 
role in the political arena. 
 
In reviewing the history of humanitarianism, it is critical to understand who funds this multi-
billion dollar empire. Knowing who is bankrolling the aid business gives us valuable insight 
into who shapes the agenda. The total aid budget grew from 2 billion dollars in 1990, to over 
six billion in 2000. Today it stands at a staggering 18 billion.58 Who is behind this money? 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Leader, Nicholas, The Politics of Principle: “The principles of humanitarian action in practice,“ 
Humanitarian Policy Group Report, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000, p.12  
55 Leader, Nicholas, The Politics of Principle: “The principles of humanitarian action in practice,“ 
Humanitarian Policy Group Report, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000, p.11  
56 Rotberg, Robert, Weiss, Thomas.G, From massacres to genocide: the media, public policy, and 
humanitarian crises, Cambridge Massachusetts: Brookings Institution Press, 1996, p. 171-175 
57 Barnett, Michael, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2011, p10  
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Governments contribute 80 percent of the humanitarian budget.59 A variety of private actors, 
such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have also redefined the landscape. In 
addition, religious and corporate organizations make their contribution. The internet-boom, 
with its social media component, has tapped directly into individual donations from ordinary 
citizens, multiplying available funds. 
 
These billions of dollars have turned a relatively small movement into a gigantic business. 
The mushrooming of aid agencies demonstrates this expansion. There were only a handful of 
agencies in Somalia in 1992. In 1999, there were about 250 in Kosovo. Hundreds assisted in 
the aftermath of the Tsunami in Indonesia in 2004. Close to a thousand organizations 
descended upon Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake.60  
 
Despite a global economic meltdown that has driven households to the very brink of poverty, 
the aid business is here to stay. In fact, some argue that the growing financial divide between 
rich and poor augurs well for humanitarianism. Capitalism needs humanitarianism to placate 
the frustrations faced by the poor.61  
 
It therefore becomes more vital for humanitarians to do some soul searching. The four 
principles that govern humanitarianism are a good place to start.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59OECD, DAC1 Official and Private Flows.  http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE1 
[last accessed December 27 2011]	  
60	  Barnett, Michael, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2011, p. 3 
61 De Waal, Alex, Famine Crimes: Politics & The Disaster Relief Industry in Africa.-(African Issues), 
Oxford: African Rights % The International African Institute in association with James Currey and 
Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 221	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4.3 Overview over the Humanitarian Principles 
 
Table 2: 
 
Overview over the Humanitarian Principles 
 
 
The principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence are the 
pillars of UN humanitarian efforts. The General Assembly mandated in 1991 the first three 
principles [resolution 46/182]62. It added the fourth principle, operational independence, in 
2004 under resolution 58/114.63 The vast majority of humanitarian organizations also commit 
themselves to these principles. 
 
Abiding by these four principles is considered an essential component of humanitarian 
response. The principles provide a code of conduct for actors, which is vital when operating 
in fragile or chaotic environments where governance structures are weakened. This serves as 
a way to self-police. By putting humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62General Assembly Resolution 46/182 Dec 19th 1991	  
63General Assembly Resolution 58/114 Feb 5th 2004  
HUMANITY 
Human suffering must be addressed wherever it may be found; this is the 
fundamental principle that humanitarian efforts must put the needs of people first. 
  
NEUTRALITY 
Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities, or engage in controversies of a 
political racial, religious, or ideological nature. 
 
IMPARTIALITY 
Humanitarian assistance must be delivered on the basis of need alone, giving priority 
to the most urgent cases of distress without discriminating on the basis of nationality, 
race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions. 
 
OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
Humanitarian action must be autonomous; and implementation must be independent 
from the political, economic or military objectives. 
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independence at the center of their work, humanitarian actors distinguish themselves from 
entities motivated by questionable interests.64 
 
The principles also serve a pragmatic function. They legitimize an aid organization’s 
intervention in disasters. By rendering them neutral and impartial, they give aid organizations 
the unique privilege to go to places where actors with political affiliations could not go. Aid 
organizations are free to go to crises providing relief under the protective umbrella of these 
principles.65  The following is an examination of each principle in detail. 
 
 
4.4 The Principle of Humanity 
 
The principle of humanity states that human suffering must be addressed wherever it may be 
found; this is the fundamental principle that humanitarian efforts must put the needs of people 
first.66 The principle of humanity hence permeates every aspect of humanitarian intervention. 
This is the very humanitarian imperative that the global community must take the necessary 
steps to end all human suffering, and that all civilians affected by conflict and calamity have a 
right to protection and assistance. 
 
Whereas the other three principles define specific parameters of engagement, humanity is the 
core ethic from which the desire to assist stems.67 However, a closer look suggests 
humanitarian actors respond inconsistently to global crises.  
 
Alleviating human suffering wherever it may be found is therefore not always the deciding 
factor for where to provide relief. UN spending on emergency response clearly shows that 
political considerations take center stage in deciding where to provide relief or not. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64OCHA on Message: Humantarian Principles 
ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM_HumPrinciple_English.pdf [last accessed 2 January 2012] 
65 Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: International Development Committee, The 
Humanitarian Response to the Pakistan Floods: Seventh Report of Session 2010-12 Volume 1 p.61 
66OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Principles 
ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM_HumPrinciple_English.pdf [last accessed 2 January 2012] 
67Provost Rene, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, p. 197- 201	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CASE STUDY: Humanity 
 
While donor governments provided the UN with $207 to spend per person in Kosovo in 1999, only $16 per person 
was granted to Sierra Leone and $8 per person in the Congo.68 Donors to the UN have a say where they want their 
money to be spent. It is their checkbooks that ultimately decided that the crisis in Kosovo was more important than 
the one in the Congo. 69 Thompson argues that large powers, especially Europeans, had a close interest in helping 
Kosovar refugees in Macedonia and Albania. Their fear was that they would try to immigrate to other countries in 
Europe. By providing them with what they needed in Albania and Macedonia, this risk was lowered. Apart from 
national interests, the Kosovars also had the advantage to be in the center of media attention, bringing their plight 
to the forefront of events. The crisis in the Congo, however, was not on the radar. Scholars call this the ‘CNN 
effect’ and argue that highly publicized disasters tend to get more assistance from donors.70Another aspect that 
might have played to the advantage of the refugees in the Kosovo is that they share race and ethnicity with the 
biggest donors to the UN. Scholars and practitioners such as Rieff and Thompson find that race and ethnicity 
influence the level of response. People generally empathize more with those they share similarities.71 The biggest 
donors to the UN are western countries. The United States alone contributes a quarter of the UN’s budget-- no 
prizes for guessing whose agenda dominates.72 
 
Walter and Maxwell argue that humanitarian agencies are caught between those who are 
suffering and those who have the means to end the suffering. They are pulled among their 
various, often conflicting, accountabilities. This is compounded by demands to satisfy their 
own organizational agendas and standards.73 (This will be examined in detail in chapter 5). 
Aid organizations grapple with the obstacles of finite resources and conflicting agendas in 
often highly politicized emergency contexts.  It is impossible to address all suffering in the 
world simultaneously. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Jefferys, Anna, "Giving Voice to Silent Emergencies," Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, 
Humanitarian Practice Network at the Overseas Development Institute, London: 2002 
69 Thompson, Larry, “Humanitarian Emergencies: Why Does Kosovo Get More Aid than the Congo?” 
Geneva: Paper for the ICVA Conference on NGOs in a Changing World Order: Dilemmas and 
Challenges, 2003 p.1 http://www.icva.ch/doc00000937.html [last accessed January 2, 2012] 
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4.5 The Principle of Neutrality 
The principle of neutrality stipulates that humanitarian actors must not take sides in 
hostilities, or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.74 
This is the assurance given by humanitarian agencies that their efforts are not in support of 
any side to a conflict. 
 
Neutrality is perhaps the most debated of humanitarian principles. Questions abound, whether 
neutrality is in practice attainable, or even desirable as a moral imperative.  Anderson argues 
that  “neutrality involves a willful silence as to rights and wrongs of a conflict, and because, 
sometimes, there are right sides and wrong sides, neutrality cannot be the end of the moral 
discussion.”	  75 He further postulates that neutrality and impartiality are adjuncts to the main 
question of justice, which they often refuse to address for pragmatic reasons. 
 
Being neutral in conflicts is a particularly delicate balance for the UN. Its comparative 
advantage is based on a broad perception that it is neutral and does not take sides in a 
conflict. Its credibility in humanitarian contexts rests on the notion that it is concerned with 
alleviating human suffering, not serving as the judge of right or wrong. 
 
On the other hand, the UN is expected to serve as the moral conscience of the world. People, 
particularly those afflicted, expect the UN to take a stance against perpetrators of human 
rights violations. They expect the UN to be the voice of the voiceless, which in itself is a 
direct affront to neutrality.  It is also difficult for the world body to break the code of silence, 
as they are bound by political considerations. The UN is governed by the very member states 
that it is, at times, supposed to condemn. 
 
The question is, how far can the UN remain neutral at the risk of losing relevance as the 
premier champion of those in need?  Not speaking out in the face of gross violations of 
human rights chips away at the UN’s credibility. Yet speaking out jeopardizes access to 
people in need, the security of UN staff, and indeed its legitimacy as a neutral broker. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74OCHA on Message: Humantarian Principles ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM_  
HumPrinciple_English.pdf [last accessed 2 January 2012]  
75Anderson, Kenneth, “Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality 
for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 2003-2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts,” Harvard Human 
Rights Journal, 2004, p. 69 	  
	   33	  
Among the most interesting of the many ambiguities entwined around the principle of 
neutrality, is the very functioning of the United Nations and the contradicting responsibilities 
of its most powerful organ, the Security Council. This single body authorizes both military 
and humanitarian interventions. 
A recent example is Libya and the events that followed the revolution that began in February 
2011. On March 17th 2011 the Security Council passed resolution 1973 authorizing 
airstrikes, which resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombings 
effectively bringing an end to the 42 year long rule of Colonel Muammar Gadaffi.76 
Subsequently, the Council mandated, in resolution SC/2009 from September 16, 2011,77 a 
humanitarian support mission to the country. 
It is difficult to fathom that the people on either side of the conflict in Libya, would deem the 
humanitarian mission one hundred percent neutral; a mission authorized by the same Security 
Council that only a few months before authorized a military action. The organizational 
structure of the UN, from the beginning, places it at odds with the principle of neutrality. 
The UN was well aware of this potential trapping. This is the reason why it has distinct 
bodies responsible for political or peacekeeping operations (The Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations) and humanitarian affairs (Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and 
various specialized agencies such as UNICEF). These intricate distinctions may be apparent 
to the UN itself. For the people in the countries where the UN operates, there is no distinction 
between the humanitarian and political branch of the UN. All these entities are seen squarely 
as a single UN body. 
 
A study conducted by the Integration Steering Group, which is comprised of a range of UN 
entities and other stakeholders, demonstrate this point. 78 A statement made by a political 
mission can compromise the neutrality of a humanitarian mission. 
The UN is increasingly aware that the blurring of lines between political/ military missions 
hampers relief activities. OCHA, the UN departments of peacekeeping operations (DPKO) 
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and for political affairs (DPA) jointly commissioned in 2011 a study to look into how to 
effectively protect Humanitarian Space in joint missions.79 
Safeguarding the Humanitarian Space is a practical and strategic necessity for the United 
Nations. In instances where the UN is, justly or unjustly, perceived as taking sides, the 
consequences have been dire. Iraq is a case in point. On August 19, 2003, a truck on a suicide 
mission bombed the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, killing twenty-two lives and injuring 
many more.80 
 
The Humanitarian Policy Group investigated the possible reasons for the outbursts of 
violence against aid workers. One of the main findings was that “ the increase in violence 
against aid workers seen during the past three years is at least partly politically oriented.”81 
The researches note that humanitarian actors find themselves as targets because they are 
perceived as collaborating with the enemy. The blurring of lines between political UN 
missions and UN agencies with entirely different mandates can jeopardize both their work 
and put their staff lives at risk.82 
 
Organizations, such as the Red Cross, are purists in defending the principle of neutrality. 
Others, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, are outright rejecting the principle of neutrality 
where it is seen to enable continued human rights violations. They deem it their humanitarian 
duty to denounce such atrocities. 
 
The Biafra war in Nigeria is cited as a defining moment in breaking with the principle of 
neutrality. David Rieff explores Médecins Sans Frontières’ break with the model of silence, 
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stemming from the Biafra war, adopting instead a model of delivering humanitarian aid while 
bearing witness publicly to what it saw.83 
 
 
CASE STUDY: The Biafra War 
 
The Biafra war refers to the Nigerian civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970 and is considered a critical turning 
point in humanitarianism. The conflict put the Biafra region a secessionist part of Nigeria under blockade by the 
Nigerian government.  Resulting In large numbers of people being internally displaced on the Biafran side and 
threatened by starvation, the conflict triggered a massive media campaign to provide support to victims.84 While 
humanitarian organizations, such as UNICEF and OXFAM, engaged in distribution of supplies, the Red Cross is 
widely credited for leading the relief efforts. UNHCR at that time only assisted refugees and did not get involved 
in issues regarding internally displaced populations. 85 The Red Cross provided relief, remaining silent, in the name 
of neutrality, despite witnessing forced starvation and migration.86 Disapproving of the silence in the face of 
injustice, Bernard Kouchner and other doctors split from the Red Cross and founded Médecins Sans Frontières.87 
They were convinced that remaining silent would make them responsible for the killings.  
 
 
The Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières illustrate two different approaches to the 
principle of neutrality. While the Red- Cross strictly defends the principle of neutrality 
including the ideal of silence, Médecins Sans Frontières has its roots in breaking with this 
ideal as part of the principle. The NGO finds it unconscionable to remain silent in the face of 
blatant violations of human rights. Kenneth Anderson argues that the decision to speak out on 
human rights violations did not strictly constitute a break with the ideal of neutrality. It 
represented a break with the ideal of silence in order to have access to suffering people.88 
 
Others have gone even a step further by questioning if neutrality has a place in 
humanitarianism. While recognizing that neutrality is a tool to get access, is it morally 
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defendable to hold on to this principle when faced with crimes against humanity?89 The 
answer is complex. By putting themselves beyond the sovereignty of states, when they judge 
it morally justified, humanitarians might be able to save more lives. In some cases, however, 
they risk losing access to crisis zones under the control of those they denounce.  
 
Sudan offers a perfect example. In 2009 the International Criminal Court publicly thanked aid 
agencies operating in Darfur for providing critical information that led to the indictment, for 
genocide, of several Sudanese leaders. Soon after the president of Sudan evicted a dozen aid 
agencies for “colluding with the country’s enemies”.90 It has also been alleged that Médecins 
Sans Frontières’ report on the atrocities committed by the Serbs was used to legitimize the 
NATO airstrikes in Kosovo. 91 
 
O’ Brian argues that this is nothing new. Humanitarianism has always been a political 
ideology. 92  This would seem to suggest that neutrality was never achievable in the first 
place. It was rather a useful smokescreen to appear “non-political” and therefore gain the 
advantages of the Humanitarian Space. 
 
In short, neutrality is the most controversial of the humanitarian principles. 
 
 
4.6 The Principle of Impartiality 
 
The principle of impartiality stipulates that aid must be delivered on the basis of need alone, 
giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress without discriminating on the basis of 
nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.93 Impartiality goes to the 
heart of the UN charter, which affirms faith in the inalienable worth of every human being. 
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Humanitarian emergencies often occur in context of conflict between two or more parties.  In 
order to implement its work effectively, the humanitarian community must have the trust of 
the people it seeks to serve. In many cases, the cooperation of belligerent sides is necessary to 
provide life-saving services.94 All parties must have the confidence that humanitarian workers 
remain impartial in conducting their work. Impartiality hence means the non-judgmental 
delivering of aid to the population of both sides of a conflict on the sole basis of need. 
 
This is especially challenging in conflict contexts, as aid organizations have to try to get 
access to all sides of the conflict to negotiate their assistance. In conflicts, aid organizations 
run the risk of being blamed for going beyond their humanitarian mandate, if one party feels 
that an opponent has received preferential treatment. The United Nations handbook on 
Multidimensional Peacekeeping offers a practical example of why it is important to observe 
the principle of impartiality: 
 
 
CASE STUDY: Impartiality 
 
A conflict between the Lendu and Hema ethnic groups, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1999, 
displaced over 140,000 people. The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and a group of NGOs 
mobilized to respond. Both ethnic groups rushed to accuse the humanitarian community for taking sides and 
favoring the other ethnic group. In particular, the Hema community accused Médecins Sans Frontières of only 
treating the Lendu community. This led to an attack on the Médecins Sans Frontières team. 95 The issue was 
resolved and the humanitarians were able resume their work, providing relief to both sides of the conflict. 
 
 
Some of the charges leveled against the principle of neutrality apply to the problems 
humanitarians face implementing the principle of impartiality.  As these points have been 
adequately discussed in the previous section, this section will not repeat the discussion. The 
main issues include: Is impartiality desirable in the face of grave human rights violations? 
Should humanitarian actors equally give aid to the perpetrators of injustice as well as 
victims? As Bernard Kouchner and his colleagues asserted, in breaking away from the Red 
Cross, are humanitarians complicit in the killing of innocent people when they feed and 
clothe the perpetrators? 
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The violation of the principle of impartiality is not only a problem in conflict settings. 
Preferential distribution of aid can also occur in disaster contexts, such as Haiti. The author 
during his time as a humanitarian in Haiti witnessed first hand the violation of this principle. 
Aid was not always distributed on the basis of need alone. Infrastructure projects were 
sometimes built in areas directly benefitting the elite and government officials, excluding the 
poor, the very people who needed these services most. 
 
Pressure to violate impartiality can come from local stakeholders, on whose collaboration 
humanitarians depend to fulfill their mandates.96 Those stakeholders can pressure aid workers 
to give assistance for their political or economic gain. Maintaining principled humanitarian 
action against these kinds of pressure is an essential, but not easy task. In some cases 
compelling operational circumstances can make it necessary to make concessions for a more 
efficient humanitarian action. 
 
Moral considerations are not the only factors pressuring humanitarian actors to compromise 
the humanitarian principles. 97 Donors, with their thick wallets, are a far bigger challenge to 
impartiality. They can channel funds towards some emergencies and neglect others according 
to their political preference and prospects for socio-economic gains, together with 
opportunities for increased political leverage. Ferris argues that political interests are 
detrimental in determining where to give help and how much. She finds that disasters situated 
geographically closer to donors, are likely to get higher funding than far away crises.98 
 
Though not easy to withstand the pressure, by showing active commitment to honor the 
principle of impartiality, humanitarians can prevent donor influence from becoming a 
convenient excuse for jeopardizing their integrity.99 
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4.7 The Principle of Operational Independence 
 
The principle of operational independence stipulates that humanitarian action must be 
autonomous. Its implementation must be independent from the political, economic or military 
objectives.100 Demanding that humanitarian actors take their decisions freely and 
independently from any other motives, the concept of independence seeks to strengthen the 
principles of neutrality and impartiality. 
 
It is debated whether operational independence is attainable when agencies receive the 
majority of their funding from governments.101 These governments often have clear interests 
and consider aid an extension of their foreign policy. The proliferation of government-
affiliated funding mechanisms, such as the United Nations Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Canadian International Development Agency is a concern. 
Government-affiliated aid is often considered an extension of a country’s foreign policy. 
 
This trend strengthens the hand of individual governments in the operational decisions taken 
by humanitarian agencies. Elizabeth Ferris observes that some donor governments explicitly 
use humanitarian assistance to pursue their own political interests.102 It also disregards the 
multilateral system, through which funds should primarily be channeled.103 
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CASE STUDY: Operational Independence 
 
Former USAID administrator Andre Natsios in Iraq, made it very clear to US NGOs receiving government funding 
for their work there, that their efforts had to be in line with US government objectives: “If you even mention your 
own organization once when you’re in the villages, I will tear up your contract and fire you…. You are an arm of 
the U.S. government right now, because we need to show the people of Iraq an improvement in their standard of 
living in the next year or two. And I have to have it clearly associated with the U.S. government.”104 In a similar 
case in Afghanistan, USAID contracted a private company to rehabilitate the education sector with the goal to 
bring children back to school but also to make children learn about democratic practices and attitudes.105 
 
 
In both these cases, USAID neglected the principle of independence by serving the American 
political interests. While these are obvious examples, Ferris highlights a more subtle way to 
use aid for political purposes. She argues that in many cases, donor governments insist that 
humanitarian organizations clearly brand the assistance they deliver to make recipients 
associate it with them.106 
 
In some cases, it is not the donors but the aid organizations themselves that jeopardize the 
independent nature of humanitarian assistance. High profile crises, such as the earthquake 
response in Haiti, attract a lot of non-traditional aid providers: military, paramilitary or 
private organizations engage in areas of humanitarian interest.107 The work of these actors can 
lead to a wide range of activities carried out under the flag of humanitarianism. However, by 
pursuing their own objectives, these organizations neglect the principle of independence, 
along with the other basic humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. 
 
In emergencies, such the earthquake response in Haiti, humanitarian actors rely on the help of 
the military to facilitate logistics in the provision of relief. This collaboration, however, 
results in the blurring of the line between the humanitarian and the military sphere. Fassin 
and Pandolfi find that there is a growing reciprocal interdependency of military actors and 
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humanitarians.108 The military increasingly needs humanitarians to legitimize its actions and 
humanitarians the military to have their safety ensured. 
 
For the United Nations humanitarian workers the instructions are somewhat contradictory. 
On the one hand they are required to uphold operational independence. On the other hand the 
UN explicitly instructs all its employees that they must work to support the priorities of the 
local government.  This idea is becoming more entrenched with the shift from pure relief 
work, to capacity building. In addition, the UN -- a consortium of governments -- cannot 
entirely divorce itself from its primary constituency. 
 
Again as with all the other humanitarian principles, the ideal is unquestionable but the reality 
is complex. In the next chapter, the thesis will examine in greater detail some of the dilemmas 
and paradoxes that make it extremely challenging for humanitarian agencies to be neutral, 
impartial and independent in alleviating human suffering. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE POLITICIZATION OF AID 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Although aid agencies do important work, humanitarianism is no longer the                      
ethos for many organizations within the aid industry.”109 
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5.1 The Two Faces of Humanitarianism 
 
Of the myriad of dilemmas inherent in humanitarianism, one of the most intriguing is that the 
motivation to assist others is seldom purely altruistic. Motivations range from organizational 
survival, prestige and power, feelings of guilt, a sense of superiority, religious redemption, 
career advancement, to the desire to demonstrate one’s goodness.110, 111 The relationship 
between humanitarian agencies and recipients is therefore reciprocal. Humanitarians need 
people in crisis, and vice versa. 
 
The humanitarian imperative was once the primary concern of early relief work. However, 
judging by the fact that, on average, only 30 percent reaches the ground, one can argue      
self-sustenance has become the primary business of aid organizations. International 
organizations, such as the UN, spend up to 70 percent of their budget on operational costs.  
 
A case study in Cambodia revealed that the UN spent two billion dollars spent on a mission 
there, most of it on staff salaries (about $118.5 million) and travel ($62 million). Almost 
9,000 new vehicles were purchased ($81 million). Senior UN officials were receiving a daily 
hardship allowance of $145 to supplement their salaries. At the time, the average annual 
income in Cambodia was $130.112 
 
 
5.2 Conditional donor funding 
 
Donors providing crucial funding, continue to expand their influence on where and how their 
contributions are spent.  Facing stiff competition for limited resources, agencies are 
compromised and often co-opted into political agendas. Accountability in humanitarianism 
appears to work better upward the aid chain, than downward.113 Humanitarians are 
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accountable to both donors and the people whom they assist.114 However, donors have the 
leverage to play the game in their favor.  
 
Governments provide the majority of funds for humanitarian activities. They often treat this 
aid as an extension of their foreign policy. States invest in the humanitarian sector for a 
mixture of motives, but their main reason was to pursue their own political interests. The 
integration of humanitarian departments, into the defense and foreign affairs ministries of 
many countries, bears witness to this fact. A study on the role of the United States’ overseas 
disaster assistance concluded that foreign policy and domestic factors outweigh all other 
factors influencing the country’s engagement.115  
 
Barnett rightly asks: “Did these shifts humanize the world of politics or did they politicize the 
world of humanitarianism?”116 It is likely that both states and humanitarians have ventured 
into areas of grey. What is clear is, the more influence foreign policy interests of donors have 
on the decision-making processes of UN agencies and NGOs, the less articulate their 
advocacy on behalf of victims.117 Recipients are therefore the biggest losers in the alliance 
between donors and humanitarian organizations. Rieff cautions that aid workers should worry 
about being used politically by the donors who direct them into certain places, while keeping 
them away from others.118 
 
While authors like Rieff condemn politicization of aid, which he says corrupts the 
humanitarian principles,119 Slim suggests that there is another, often neglected side to 
politicization. Instead of being worried about western powers abusing the humanitarian idea 
by incorporating it into their agendas, he suggests, critics of politicization should rather worry 
about western governments excluding humanitarianism from their politics. For Slim “a 
cleansing of the humanitarian ethic from politics that wants neither humanitarian norms, nor 
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humanitarian workers in a given political arena,” would just be as much politicization.120 He 
argues that politicization has always been part of the humanitarian idea, simply because it is a 
political concept applied in a political world.121 
 
In order to provide relief in a world saturated with political agendas, humanitarians have no 
choice but to strategize and compromise. Their challenge is to play the political game to their 
favor, without jeopardizing the interests of their recipients and by holding donors accountable 
for their commitments. To counter pressure, argue Hoffman and Weiss, humanitarians should 
stubbornly demonstrate commitment to the core values of their work against all odds.122  
 
This is easier said than done. Competition for limited resources, in a crowded field, makes 
agencies more susceptible to donor influence. Donors often tie their funding to very specific 
projects or programs.123 Earmarked funding binds aid organizations to spend money on these 
specific purposes. This jeopardizes the principle of operational independence. Pre-defining a 
purpose the money should be spent on also disqualifies the possibility to alleviate human 
suffering wherever it may be found. 
 
Political objectives are likely to always remain a factor in humanitarianism. Yet donors, 
feeling resistance, and facing successes achieved by aid agencies committed to the values of 
humanitarianism, might be inclined to play by the rules. 
 
Rivalry among aid agencies makes them susceptible to manipulation and prevents a unified 
resistance to donor influence. The limited funding and plethora of agencies means someone 
will always be ready to compromise the principles to ensure their organization’s survival. 
This attitude is not only egotistical, it is also pragmatic. It ultimately allows them to do their 
work.124  To advance their goals, aid agencies have to sell part of their soul. Others, however, 
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caution that donor pressure can also become an excuse for organizational self-politicization 
and breaking with the humanitarian principles.125 
 
 
5.3 Survival of the fittest 
 
Turf wars have become a standard ingredient of relief efforts, especially high profile 
emergencies.126 Stronger competition, due to the rapid growth of the humanitarian sector, 
means agencies are spending more and more time on flag-waving, to secure their own 
survival.127 Green notes, for instance, that twenty-seven UN entities, to some degree, assume 
themselves responsible for water and sanitation.128 Concentrated focus on the same few 
popular and visual topics, risks sidelining others.129 Agencies waste time and money fighting 
over turf, instead of maximizing overall results. 
 
The more visual an area of work, the greater the media’s interest. Publicity usually translates 
directly into more funding.130 While media collaboration is crucial for humanitarian 
organizations in order to generate more money, media also exercises pressure on 
humanitarians to hold on to their turf. Media, particularly television and the Internet have 
changed humanitarianism for good.  
 
Twenty-four hour news channels send disaster pictures into our living rooms in real time. The 
Internet enables us to directly connect with aid workers via social media. The mental distance 
to the disasters of the world is much smaller.131, 132 The influence of television goes beyond 
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see. Their portraying of a situation is ultimately likely to influence donor behavior. Piers 
Robinson notes that evidence suggests that policy makers and elite groups tend to rely on 
media as their primary indicator of public opinion.133 
 
Every UN agency and well-known NGO, has their own department dedicated to liaising with 
international media and promoting their successes, working with their recipients. The 
agencies’ communications departments aggressively market to demonstrate that they are in 
the forefront to helping people. They make sure that important activities such as food 
distributions do not go unperceived and a camera is close by at all times. Donors need to be 
impressed by the actions undertaken and the results achieved.  
 
Over the past years, social media has been discovered as a valuable tool by many agencies, to 
promote their work and reach out to private donors. Social media allows them to make 
personal and director appeals to individual donors. Facebook, for the Red Cross, for instance 
proved an effective awareness- raising tool, post the earthquake Haiti. The organization 
gained 10,000 new followers on Twitter during one week after the disaster.134 WFP, through 
social games on Facebook, managed to raise impressive $1.5 million for its food distribution 
program in Haiti, in only five days.135 
 
The addiction of humanitarian organizations to looking good however, and the competition 
for humanitarian market share, jeopardize the basis of humanitarianism, the principle of 
humanity. The relationship with the media has put aid organizations in a difficult situation. 
Motivated by the money the media can help them generate, they have somewhat replaced the 
guiding principle of humanity, with the guiding presence of the media, as determining factor 
for where to provide relief; a dilemma, aggravated by the impact of uneven media coverage 
of disasters.136  
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Organizational interests and the ambition to look good in the media can become the driving 
force for humanitarian organizations, hijacking the original purpose of their mandate. 
A leading politician brought the importance of visibility to the point, after the tsunami struck 
in Asia in 2004 “…this is a fantastic opportunity to show the world we care.”137 
 
The relief efforts in Haiti focused on Port-au-Prince neglecting hard to get to rural areas.138 
While relief was certainly needed in the capital, it was also easier and less painstaking than 
accessing hard-to-reach rural areas. Port-au-Prince was also the right spot to be for media 
coverage.  
 
Visibility brings money, but it also comes at a prize. The higher the need to be seen as doing 
good aid work, the less important the needs defined by the local communities that the 
organization claim to assist. By marginalizing, or neglecting, the real concerns of the 
recipients, the principle of humanity is forgotten and replaced by market economics. Donor 
funding and media coverage becomes an end in itself.139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137As quoted in: Ramalingam, Barnett: The Humanitarian’s Dilemma: collective action or inaction in 
international relief? London: Overseas Development Institute Background Note, 2010, p.4 	  
138 CARE – Save the Children: Haiti Joint Evaluation Report, October 2010 p.4  
139The Lancet, “Growth of Aid and the Decline of Humanitarianism,” Volume 375, Issue 9711, January 
2010, p. 253 	  
	   49	  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
   HAITI SITUATION ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The situation after the earthquake was a circus. Picture a thousand humanitarian 
organizations running around in Port au Prince, some without a clue 
 if they were coming or going. It was a mess.”140 
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6.1 Haiti Pre-Earthquake 
 
Haiti has a long-standing reputation as the consistently poorest country in the western 
hemisphere. On the humanitarian development index of 2007/ 2008 Haiti ranked 146 out of 
177 countries.141 The country’s per capita income is $250. This is less than one-tenth of the 
average in Latin America.142 The reasons for Haiti’s poverty have their roots in a long history 
of exploitation by foreign forces, as well as its own leaders.  
 
Haiti attained independence from France in 1804 on the condition that it would pay a large 
indemnity to its colonizer. This impoverished the country from the start. The United States, 
fearful of an American slave revolt, only recognized the new country under the condition that 
the country would agree to the deal with France and thereby discouraging its own slave 
population from aspiring for freedom.143 In addition, the US occupied Haiti in 1915. When 
the Americans left in 1934, the country’s institutions were withered.144 
 
Corruption and poor governance bedevil this country of 10 million people. The regimes of 
Francois and Jean Claude Duvalier that lasted from 1957 to 1986, forced a great number of 
intellectuals and skilled human resources out of the country.145 In the past decades, Haiti 
struggled with a series of socio-political issues that impoverished it further. This volatile 
political environment makes Haiti unattractive to private investors. This has contributed to 
negative annual growth rates of 5 percent in the recent years.  
 
Haiti has one of the worst records of investment in human capital. Only 20 percent of the 
resources in the public sector go to rural areas where two thirds of the Haitians live.146 
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The lack of basic needs, such as food and water, leads to grave food security problems in the 
country. In 2008, food insecurity worsened as a result of rising prices. More than half of the 
Haitian population was underfed. In 2004, only 54 percent of the population had access to 
safe water, while only 30 percent had access to improved sanitation.147 
 
In addition to all these challenges, Haiti’s geographical location makes it extremely 
vulnerable to natural hazards. The Caribbean island nation lies in the middle of a hurricane 
belt, with 1,771 km of coastline, making the country subject to severe storms during the 
regular hurricane season. Lack of public structures, widespread poverty and deforestation 
amplify the impact of these natural hazards.148  
 
Mudslides provoked by torrential rains, wash away entire villages every year in the 
mountainous country, leaving many dead or wounded. In the years between 2001 and 2007 
hurricanes and tropical storms left more than 18,000 people dead and 132,000 people 
homeless. In total 6,4 million people out of Haiti’s population of 10 million were affected.149  
 
Despite all its challenges, Haiti had made strides towards development and stability since 
2004.150 The earthquake that hit Haiti on 12 January 2010 set the country back.  
 
 
6.2 Haiti Post-Earthquake 
 
Just before sunset, an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 on the Richter scale hit Haiti. It killed 
more than 220, 000 people and destroyed Port-au-Prince and other big southern cities.151 The 
government, many of its officials dead and its systems destroyed, was paralyzed.152 For three 	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days, the head of the devastated nation was nowhere to be found. In less than 48 hours 
assumed leadership. Without control, aid organizations of all kinds swarmed into the country 
and turned it into, what is sometimes referred to as a, “Republic of NGOs”.153,154 While many 
were helpful, they also contributed to the chaos. 
 
Internally displaced people started to occupy free plots of land anywhere they could. At the 
peak of displacement, 2.3 million people were without shelter155 and 1.5 million people lived 
in 1,354 spontaneous settlements. One year after the earthquake 810,000 people still lived in 
1,150 IDP camps.156 The conditions in the camps are squalid, often consisting of tarpaulins 
tied to wooden sticks or makeshift huts made out of scrap metal. People in camps are highly 
vulnerable to heavy rains, threatening to wash away the meager possessions. 
 
In the aftermath of the earthquake, food was in short supply. Malnutrition in children 
worsened, with about 15,000 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition.  Estimates 
suggest, that one in three children in Haiti, is chronically malnourished.157 People, especially 
children and the elderly, were at high risk of contracting infectious diseases. Water and waste 
management worsened. Hazardous ditches clogged with human feces and trash, were now 
winding through the numerous tent cities.158  The cholera outbreak in October, made the 
sanitation issue an even more pressing one. Hospitals were unable to cope; thirty had been 
damaged by the earthquake.159  
 
The chaotic situation after the earthquake and especially in the many IDP camps was a 
particularly great hazard for women and girls. Lack of security facilitated sexual violence. 
Many of the people living in camps lost their families in the disaster. Women and adolescents 
often lived in tents by themselves. They are unprotected and highly vulnerable to abuse. More 
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than 250 cases of rape were reported in the first 150 days after the earthquake.160 The 
authorities provided limited assistance to victims.161 
 
One year after the earthquake, parts of Haiti’s capital look exactly as they did a day after the 
earthquake. Some roads are still filled with rubble of concrete buildings with human remains 
still trapped in them. Only 10 to 15 percent of rubble had been removed one year after the 
earthquake.162 Part of the rubble removal is being done through cash for work programs. Run 
by aid organizations, these programs enable jobless people to contribute to the rehabilitation 
of their environment and earn money at the same time. 
  
Unemployment is a bigger problem in post-earthquake Haiti than it was before. Two thirds of 
the population does not have a formal job after the earthquake. Many businesses were 
destroyed in the event.163 The financial damages during the earthquake equal about 120 per 
cent of the country’s gross domestic product of 2009.164   
 
Members of Haiti’s middle class, who had labored for years to build a modest home, were 
among the biggest losers, now joining Haiti’s poorest with nothing left to lose. The poorest 
lack the means to help themselves. Mostly, they fear for their children’s future, citing 
education as a priority need. The earthquake was an enormous setback for education, 3978 
schools were damaged or destroyed.165 
 
The death toll claimed and destruction done by the quake, highlight the fact that poor 
countries are by far more susceptible to natural hazards than wealthier ones. The earthquake 
that hit Chile a few weeks later was far stronger, yet caused minimal damage and loss of life 
compared to Haiti.166  Chile is wealthier. Strict building codes and a sound emergency 	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response saved many lives. While Haiti was numbed by the earthquake and dependent on 
foreign aid, Chile helped itself, even outright rejecting foreign aid.167The year that began with 
a deadly earthquake, ended with a cholera epidemic that killed 7000 people.  The people of 
Haiti were left ever more depended on aid. 
 
 
6.3 The UN Response in Haiti 
 
Previous to the earthquake, there were nine specialized UN agencies and a peacekeeping 
mission. The mission, MINUSTAH, was mandated in 2004168 to support the government in 
maintaining peace and security in the country. The earthquake weakened the UN, killing 102 
staff members and destroyed the mission’s Headquarters. This was the single biggest loss in 
the UN’s history. Its capacity to respond was curtailed.  
 
To cope, the UN redirected staff from other peacekeeping operations around the world to 
Haiti. The specialized agencies drastically bolstered their manpower and were joined by 
seven other agencies. The UN country team worked together under the lead of the mission to 
tackle the many different needs in the country post the disaster. The Office for Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs was overseeing relief efforts and liaising with the myriad of NGOs 
doing in the country. The UN’s initial relief efforts were focused on immediate needs, such as 
providing shelter, food, water and basic health care to the affected population.  
 
After the immediate response phase, the UN focused on rebuilding the demolished 
infrastructure including rubble removal, to rehabilitate destroyed neighborhoods and the 
reconstruction of damaged or collapsed schools.169 The specialized agencies supported the 
government in strengthening its capacities to deliver basic services to its citizens. They also 
worked with communities on their recovery from the disaster. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2010/0302/Chile-earthquake-facts-Chile-vs.-Haiti-in-
numbers [last accessed January 2, 2012]	  
167Padgett, Tim, Chile and Haiti: A Tale of Two Earthquakes, Time Magazine March 01, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1968576,00.html#ixzz1gJ2dDek0 [last accessed January 
2, 2012] 
168 Security Council resolution 1542,	   
169 UN, Report of the United United Nations in Haiti 2010, Situation, Challenges and Outlook p.12, 13	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Table 3:  
 
The UN Actors in Haiti170 
 
   NAME OF ENTITY     MAIN AREAS OF WORK 
UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
MINUSTAH 
• Rule	  of	  Law	  
• Logistical	  Support	  to	  humanitarian	  activities	  
Office of the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs 
OCHA 
• Coordination	  of	  all	  UN	  entities	  
• Liaising	  between	  NGOs	  and	  military	  actors	  
UN Children’s Fund 
UNICEF 
• Child	  protection	  
• Nutrition	  
• Water	  and	  sanitation	  
• Building	  schools	  
World Food Programme 
WFP 
• Food	  security	  
• School	  Meals	  
• Nutrition	  
Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 
OHCHR 
• Protection	  of	  human	  rights	  
• Rule	  of	  law	  
UN Joint Programme on HIV AIDS 
UNAIDS 
• Fights	  against	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  tuberculosis	  
• Reactivating	  HIV	  centers	  
UN Development Programme 
UNDP 
• Livelihoods	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  
• Cash	  for	  work	  
• Strengthening	  governance	  &	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  
UN Environment Programme 
UNEP 
• Environment	  and	  climate	  change	  
• Sustainable	  natural	  resource	  management	  
UN Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization 
UNESCO 
• Education	  
• Vocational	  training	  
• Advocacy	  for	  culture	  
• Youth	  mobilization	  through	  culture	  
UN Population Fund 
UNFPA 
• Maternal	  and	  reproductive	  health	  
• Family	  planning	  
• Demographic	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 UNITED Nations in Haiti http://www.onu-haiti.org/agencies-partners/ [last accessed December 2, 
2011] 
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UN Human Settlements Programme 
UN-Habitat 
• Housing	  
• Urban	  planning	  and	  management	  
• Municipal	  development	  
UN Refugee Agency 
UNHCR 
• Protection	  internally	  displaced	  people	  
• Prevention	  of	  forced	  evictions,	  
• Family	  reunification	  
International Labor Organization 
ILO 
• Labor	  rights,	  
• Livelihoods,	  vocational	  training	  
• Small	  and	  medium	  businesses	  
UN Office for Project Services 
UNOPS 
• Project	  management	  
• Transitional	  and	  permanent	  shelters	  
• Infrastructure	  
• Debris	  removal	  
UN Women 
• Gender	  equality	  
• Women’s	  rights	  
• Gender-­‐based	  violence	  
Food and Agriculture Organization 
FAO 
 
• Food	  security	  
• Support	  to	  farmers	  
• Seeds,	  tools	  and	  fertilizers.	  
World Health Organization 
WHO • Broad	  range	  of	  health	  issues	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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
RESULTS OF SURVEY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“In real life, you want to help people. But as an organization, you need to show that you are 
better than everybody else and keep the money coming in. That’s reality.”171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Participant in survey, UN humanitarian worker 
	  58	  
Q 2: For the UN what are the major challenges of operating in a high profile disaster          
where there are many international actors involved, such as in Haiti? 
 
Table 4: 
 
 
 
Lack of coordination among the humanitarian actors was the number one challenge faced in 
responding to the earthquake. The16 UN agencies’ mandates overlapped at times, which 
resulted in duplication of efforts. The office responsible for coordination, OCHA, is seen as 
having failed in fulfilling its mandate. It is illustrative that during the initial response phase, 
OCHA was commonly nicknamed “Organized Chaos in Haiti”. 
 
The agenda of humanitarians were not attuned to local needs. Participants reported that the 
Haitian government was widely excluded from planning the relief activities; joint situation 
analysis and information management for needs assessments proved difficult. The civil 
society was ignored and needs assessments conducted without is help. The results were relief 
activities that did not necessarily meet the real needs of the people. 
 
The participants also felt under pressure, from both internal and external forces. Under the 
close watch of the donors and the media’s scrutiny, they felt pressured to deliver visible 
results quickly. The stressful emergency context with a multitude of needs that had to be 
attended to simultaneously exerted its own pressure.  
 
Participants also reported that agencies competed for turf and visibility, to the detriment of 
the work. Other factors, such as inexperienced and incompetent humanitarian staff, the poor 
capacity of the Haitian government to engage in the relief efforts and the blurring of lines 
between humanitarian and military actors were also challenged relief efforts. 
[Refer to sections 8.4, 8.3 and 8.2 for a discussion of these results. 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
Lack of coordination 90% 
Neglect of local needs 40% 
Internal and external Pressure 37.5% 
Competition among aid agencies 27.5% 
Staff incompetence 15% 
Poor capacity of Haitian government 15% 
Blurring humanitarian and military lines 5% 
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Q3: What in your view are the three primary concerns motivating the international 
humanitarian agencies that are operating in Haiti post the earthquake? 
 
 
Table 5: 
 
 
 
Saving lives and improving the overall situation for the people afflicted was the factor cited 
most by the participants, when asked what motivated humanitarian agencies to engage in 
relief activities in Haiti. This appears somewhat inconsistent with responses throughout the 
survey, when donor pressure and organizational interest are consistently cited as overriding 
the humanitarian imperative. It would then appear participants might be rationalizing the 
motivations for why they do their work, as this question goes to the core of their own 
integrity. Or perhaps this is the ideal that they chase and is often sullied by reality. 
 
The second major concern mentioned was their organizational survival. The fact that Haiti 
was a high profile disaster, in the spotlight of international media, attracted many aid 
organizations. Being seen doing good work in the disaster promised to enhance the image of 
an organization in the eyes of donors who would respond with higher funding. 
 
The third main factor was the ambition to support the Haitian government in the aftermath of 
the earthquake and strengthen its capacities to coordinate the relief efforts. The government 
had lost many of its civil servants in the earthquake and with 60%172 of its economic and 
administrative infrastructure destroyed it had emerged crippled from the event and was 
unable to coordinate the relief efforts. 
 
[Refer to sections 8.2, 8.8 and 8.9, for a discussion of these results.]  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, Facts and figures about the earthquake, cholera, and 
development challenges in Haiti.p.1 http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/relief-and-recovery/key-statistics/ 
[last accessed January 2, 2012]	  	  
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
Alleviating human suffering 82.5% 
Survival of organization 40% 
Building the capacity of Haitian Gov. 17.5% 
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Q 4: In theory four fundamental principles guide humanitarian work (humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality, and operational independence). In practice, do you find that 
humanitarian agencies abide by these core principles? 
 
 
Table 6: 
 
RESPONSE PERCENTAGE 
Sometimes 67.5% 
Yes 27.5% 
No 5% 
 
 
 
Participants overwhelmingly felt that humanitarian workers abide by the core humanitarian 
principles only sometimes. Reasons for this included that donor interests dominated the 
humanitarian agenda. 
 
Those who reported that humanitarian principles were not followed at all attributed this to 
humanitarian workers prioritizing urban communities over rural areas, which received only 
marginal attention. 
 
[Refer to section 8.2 for a discussion of these results].  
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Q5: What makes it difficult to practice the principle of humanity/ putting people first? 
 
 
Table 7: 
 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
Drive for organizational survival 53% 
Difficult socio-political context in Haiti 35% 
UN staff Incompetence 20% 
Lack of access to the afflicted 15% 
Overwhelmed by day-to-day demands 15% 
 
 
Participants cited the drive for survival of the organization as the number one impediment to 
the principle of humanity. Dependency on donor’s good will jeopardizes this principle if 
humanitarian organizations place funding needs above those of the people they serve. The 
difficult socio-political context in Haiti is also seen as a challenge. Corrupt government 
entities complicated relief efforts by keeping aid goods blocked in the customs and 
sometimes asking for up to 100% in tax for the goods to be cleared. 
 
Participants report that government officials diverted aid towards areas directly beneficial to 
them.  UNICEF, in its school construction program, for instance, depended on the 
government’s guidance on where to build schools. In some cases, additional classrooms were 
built in schools run by friends of government officials, hardly damaged by the earthquake. 
Yet some schools that desperately needed reconstruction were ignored. 
 
Some Haitian partner NGOs crucial to assess the needs on the ground, were unreliable since 
they often lacked the necessary training to deal with the complex relief efforts. Incompetence 
of humanitarian workers who do not have sufficient experience in disaster response was also 
a major problem. In addition, lack of commitment to the needs of the people and valuing their 
own career and financial interest hindered relief works. Many were not familiar with the 
principles at all. Lack of access to afflicted people and the overwhelming day-to-day needs 
were also mentioned as obstacles to alleviating human suffering wherever it may be found. 
 
[Refer to sections 8.7 and 8.9 for a discussion of these results.]  
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Q 6: What makes it difficult to practice the principles of neutrality and impartiality? 
 
 
Table 8: 
 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
Internal and external pressure 55% 
Difficult socio-political context in Haiti 47.5% 
UN staff incompetence 15% 
Blurring humanitarian and military lines 12.50% 
 
 
The majority of the participants mentioned external and internal pressure as a challenge to 
practicing the principles of neutrality and impartiality. The fact that donors hold the purse 
strings can put agencies under pressure to align activities according to their expectations and 
requirements. The strong presence of the media in Haiti amplifies the pressure on the 
agencies to prioritize projects that generate the highest visibility at the expense of projects 
that meet the real needs of the people. 
 
UN agencies, operating in highly politicized environments depend on political acceptance and 
support of host governments. Their mandates require them to maintain good relationships 
with government officials, which can undermine the agencies’ neutrality and impartiality.      
It also undermines their ability to resist governmental pressure. 
 
The complex socio-political context was mentioned second often as jeopardizing the principle 
of neutrality and impartiality– see Question 5. 
 
The participants also mentioned other factors such as staff incompetence and the blurring of 
lines between humanitarian actors and military actors as being an obstacle to practicing the 
principles of neutrality and impartiality. 
 
[Refer to sections 8.2, 8.5 and 8.7 in Chapter eight, for discussion of these results.]  
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Q7: What makes it difficult to practice the principle of operational independence? 
 
 
Table 9: 
 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
Internal and external Pressure 77.5% 
Need to cooperate with Haitian Gov. 30% 
UN staff incompetence 17.5% 
 
 
When the participants were asked about the challenges to practicing the principle of 
operational independence, most of them mentioned internal and external pressure. The 
dependence on donor funding, the need to get positive media attention and the specific 
organizations’ mandates, were found to highly impair the ability of humanitarian agencies to 
act purely abiding by the principle of independence. 
 
The need to cooperate with the Haitian Government was another problem. They felt 
dependent on the government for: authorization to be in the country; provision of security; 
and for admittance of foreign relief goods into Haiti. This dependence on the government is 
seen as an obstacle to operational independence, especially when the Haitian government 
attached clear political agendas to its authority. 
 
The fact that many humanitarians were not familiar with the emergency context in Haiti made 
dependent.  Biased and poor decisions by managers of agencies were also cited as major 
obstacles to practicing operational independence 
 
[Refer to sections 8.2, 8.7 and 8.8 for a discussion of these results.]  
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Q8: In practice what is strongest in driving the humanitarian agenda? 
  
 
Figure 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants reported that the need to alleviate human suffering is the strongest driving force 
behind humanitarian organizations, followed by donor agenda, organizational interests and 
the local government, in order of influence. This appears somewhat inconsistent with 
responses throughout the survey, when donor pressure and organizational interest are 
consistently cited as overriding the humanitarian imperative.  
 
For example, in question 13, participants named the neglect of local needs as the biggest 
shortcoming of the UN response in Haiti. Again, as question 3, it would then appear that 
participants might be rationalizing the motivations for why they do their work, as this is a 
question that goes to the core of their own integrity.  It is also rather glaring, that while 
stating that the needs of the people come first, they say, in the same question, that the Haitian 
government is the most negligible force in driving the humanitarian response; the government 
is the official representative of the Haitian people.  
 
[Refer to sections 8.2 and 8.8 for a further discussion of these results.]  
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Q9: The One-Year-Report by MINUSTAH says the most pressing need in post earthquake 
Haiti is securing the rule of law (police, courts, judiciary) Do you agree? 
 
 
 
Table 10: 
 
RESPONSE PERCENTAGE 
Somewhat 40% 
Yes 32.5% 
No 27.5% 
 
 
 
Forty percent of the participants did not fully agree or disagree. They recognized the 
importance of the rule of law, but equally emphasized the grave need for food and jobs. 
 
Thirty-two and a half percent agreed that the rule of law was indeed the most pressing need in 
post-earthquake Haiti. From their perspective securing the rule of law provides a solid 
framework for other government institutions, enabling them to cover their citizens’ basic 
needs in the long run. 
 
[Refer to section 8.3 a for a discussion of these results.]  
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Q10: Would the people of Haiti agree that the rule of law is their most pressing need? 
 
 
 
Table 11: 
 
RESPONSE PERCENTAGE 
No 70% 
Somewhat 25% 
Yes 5% 
 
 
 
Interestingly, when asked if the people of Haiti would agree that the rule of law was their 
most pressing need, the same people who had cited this as the number one priority now 
disagreed. An overwhelming 70% said that for most Haitians jobs would be their most 
pressing need. Some rationalized this discrepancy as Haitians not really understanding the 
meaning of the rule of law. Only a marginal amount of participants fully agreed that Haitians 
would name the rule of law as their most pressing need. 
 
[Refer to section 8.3 for a discussion of these results.]  
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Q11: What in your view are the top three pressing needs in Haiti? 
 
 
Table 12: 
 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
Basic needs 70% 
Rule of Law 67.5% 
Education 47.5% 
Jobs 35% 
 
 
When the participants were asked about the top three pressing needs in Haiti, the majority 
mentioned basic needs such as housing, food and water. Thousands of people in Haiti are still 
living in IDP camps and have no jobs to sustain their families with. Without having the 
population’ basic needs covered, sustainable long- term development is not probable. 
 
The need mentioned second to basic needs was the rule of law. Some participants explained 
that the rule of law is needed as a prerequisite for all other development in the country. Apart 
from the population benefitting from overall security in Haiti, the rule of law would also 
create economic opportunities, as investors would become more interested in the country 
 
The third most pressing need mentioned was education. Some participants explained that 
vocational training in particular would enable youth to get basic jobs enabling them to rebuild 
the country’s desolate infrastructure. Capacity building is also crucial in breaking the cycle of 
independence from foreign help. 
 
The participants mentioned jobs as another pressing need for the people of Haiti to help them 
work towards a more prosperous future. 
 
[Refer to sections 8.3 and 8.8 for a discussion of these results.]  
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Q12: What were the top three successes of the UN response to the disaster in Haiti? 
 
 
Table 13: 
 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
Capacity building of Haitian Government 72.5% 
Response to basic needs 57.5% 
Maintenance of peace and security 47.5% 
Rapid fund mobilization/response 37.5% 
Prevention of disease outbreak in camps 27.5% 
 
 
When the participants were asked about the top three successes of the UN response to the 
disaster in Haiti, they most frequently mentioned strengthening and building capacity of the 
Haitian government. The UN mission and agencies provided several government institutions 
with support in taking charge of the relief coordination after the disaster. 
 
The UN’s rapid overall response and mobilization of funds after the earthquake was also 
considered a success. The participants found that the UN quickly provided the people 
affected with temporary housing, food and water. 
 
Participants said peace and security was the third great success of the UN intervention in 
Haiti. The UN achieved to uphold peace and security in the country by supporting the Haitian 
police and working in tight collaboration with the government to strengthen the rule of law in 
its institutions 
 
[Refer to sections 8.3, 8.8 and 8.9 for a discussion of these results.]  
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Q13: What are the three primary shortcomings of the UN response to the disaster in Haiti? 
 
 
Table 14: 
 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
Neglect of local needs/ perspective 55% 
Lack of coordination 52.5% 
Failure to relocate displaced people 40% 
Lack of long term vision 32.5% 
Cholera Outbreak attributed to UN 20% 
Military mixed with humanitarian response 10% 
 
 
Participants said the neglect of local needs was the UN’s primary shortcoming. 
The UN is criticized for its failure to include the local civil society in assessing needs. The 
UN did not always actively engage the Government of Haiti in the relief efforts. 
 
Lack of coordination among the relief actors was also a serious shortcoming. The 
bureaucratic mechanisms of each agency were difficult to overcome and were an obstacle to 
efficiently coordinating the efforts, resulting in duplication and waste. 
 
Following the earthquake, the biggest need is relocating those whose homes are destroyed. 
Participants say the UN put too little effort into relocating the thousands of people living in 
camps across Port-au-Prince and other southern Haitian cities such as Leogane. Clearing 
rubble and rebuilding houses and roads, took too long to implement. 
 
Other major problems were: the lack of a long-term vision and instead a narrow focus on 
immediate relief, the outbreak of cholera from a source traced to UN peacekeepers; the UN 
never acknowledged responsibility, and the dominating role of UN peacekeepers and other 
military entities in the response compromised Humanitarian Space. 
 
[Refer to sections 8.3, 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 in chapter eight, for discussion of these results.]  
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Q14: How can the UN better serve the needs of the people in Haiti? 
 
 
Table15: 
 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
Focus on local ownership 72.5% 
Focus on long term development 47.5% 
Better intra UN coordination 22.5% 
Strengthening the rule of law 10% 
Improve quality of UN staff 10% 
 
 
To better serve the needs of the people in Haiti, participants say the UN needs to put a 
stronger focus on local ownership; listening to the needs of Haitians and including them in 
the planning of humanitarian efforts. They also state that the UN needs to strengthen the 
government’s capacity to better serve its people. The UN should empower civil society to 
disseminate information about citizen rights, to help the population actively engage with their 
elected politicians. This came up as a suggestion despite its obvious conflict with the 
humanitarian principle of neutrality and non-political involvement. 
 
The participants mentioned the need to focus on long-term development. The UN they 
recommend, should implement its lessons learned during forty years of presence in Haiti. 
Some participants raise the issue that the UN’s impact has been marginal. They say that lack 
of good governance and economic stability are the longstanding challenges in Haiti. This is 
where the UN needs to invest its efforts. 
 
Other key areas that were cited as needing improvement were: intra UN coordination; the rule 
of law; and, the quality of staff. These have been adequately discussed elsewhere in the 
results section (Q2, Q9, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q13). 
 
[Refer to sections 8.3, 8.4, 8.7 and 8.9 for a discussion of these results.]  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Were some mistakes made in Haiti? Of course. Did we do some good work? Absolutely. 
Compromise is the nature of the beast in humanitarianism.”173 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173Participant in survey, UN humanitarian worker 	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8.1 Overview 
 
This thesis sought to investigate the practicability of the humanitarian principles in the 
context of crises and disasters. The hypothesis for the thesis assumed, while the humanitarian 
principles provide a valuable framework for the people responding to crises, aid workers face 
many challenges staying true to their spirit on the ground.  
 
Another question was to understand what motivates UN agencies when responding to 
disasters—where does self-interest end charity begin? What challenges do humanitarian 
workers face in remaining neutral, impartial and independent? The thesis will now discuss the 
main conclusions reached.  
 
 
8.2 External and Internal Pressure 
 
Humanitarianism is under constant tension. It is caught in the center of donor interest, 
organizational ambitions, the genuine needs of the people it serves. It is not surprising that the 
research demonstrated that pressure is the number one impediment to upholding the 
principles. This unstable balance is due to pressure felt, from the host government, the 
difficult operational environment, the competition among humanitarian actors and the 
constant glare of the media. The hypothesis has been supported by the results of the research 
in Haiti. The results showed that humanitarianism is unable to exist independently from the 
political context it is embedded in. 
 
Humanitarian aid has become a billion dollar empire; donors who are polishing their 
charitable image by investing in humanitarian activities are making political profits off it at 
the same time. With a higher share of funding coming from bilateral donors versus funds 
channeled through the UN, the pressure on humanitarian agencies has grown to incorporate 
donor interests in decisions about humanitarian interventions; hence to politicize themselves 
to a greater extend.  
 
Most donors give money on a very limiting year-by-year funding scheme. Each year’s budget 
has to be used before the allocation of the installment; the new budget is calculated on the 
basis of previous spending. This system forces agencies to empty their coffers, regardless of 
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whether the money could be spent more purposefully at a later point.174 Failure to spend the 
money results in less funding for the next year. To secure their own financial security, many 
agencies resort to spending the remaining funds on irrelevant projects, such as expensive cars 
for donations to government partners. Participants report that these cars often end up in the 
private possession of government officials.  
 
The crisis in Haiti gives a perfect example of how the business of humanitarianism works. 
While aid agencies are motivated by the desire to help people, the research clearly shows, 
institutional survival is an equal consideration. A never before seen number of humanitarian 
agencies took part in the relief efforts in Haiti. Close to a thousand175 relief actors registered 
with the UN and many more were unregistered.  
 
The crisis in the country was not only a humanitarian mega happening but also an 
international media spectacle.  This offered a possibility to humanitarian agencies to present 
themselves to the public, and ultimately to their donors, as doing necessary work. The 
possibility of being spotlighted attracts humanitarians to engage in relief activities for the 
wrong reasons. This phenomenon is nicknamed the ‘CNN effect’.  There is no denying the 
media’s powerful role to crises that might otherwise go unnoticed. Its power to show the 
world in real time what is being done to attend to the needs of the suffering, can contribute to 
a higher quality of relief work.  
 
The CNN effect is especially known and appreciated by donors who are happier to give more 
money to agencies that are visible doing work. Their calculation is that they will ultimately 
be able to use the positive image of an agency they support to their own advantage. This 
holds true for private and government donors. This entices agencies to prioritize projects to 
bring them visibility to those that will truly serve the needs of the people. This is the reason 
why humanitarian actors were crammed in Port-au-Prince, the media capital, while some 
badly hit rural areas were neglected.  
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This fight for the spotlight also stirs competition among humanitarian workers who should be 
working together. In addition, agencies spend valuable time courting the media and trying to 
balance this with the demands of their donors and the need of recipients. Flag waiving and 
turf wars were as much part of the Haitian relief activities as they were part of previous ones 
such as the Tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004. 
 
Humanitarians are forced to make difficult decisions between these diverging interests. They 
have to maneuver between various fronts trying to find a compromise satisfying everybody. 
This quest however is often doomed to end with settling for the lowest common denominator. 
These diverging interests are difficult to marry. Against the backdrop of a more competitive 
humanitarian scene, agencies feel in stronger competition with each other. Their need to 
generate funds in a world of ever-scarcer resources, pressures them to listen to their donors 
who want to see their funds turned into visible results as quick as possible. Practitioners in 
Haiti argue that in the initial response phase, focus on quantitative results jeopardized the 
quality of the intervention.176 
 
The pressure felt by humanitarian workers is not only external but comes also from within 
organizations. The narrow focus of mandates can jeopardize the humanitarian principle of 
impartiality, which stipulates that every person has a right to equal consideration for aid. 
Mandates can lend themselves as a convenient excuse for humanitarian agencies to justify 
their focus on certain areas and to neglect others.  
 
The UN’s mandate to collaborate with the government also pressures its agencies, to agree to 
work under conditions that might be in disaccord with the principles.  In Haiti, UN agencies 
were dispatched with clear orders to support the government’s work. This meant while they 
were trying to exercise operational independence they were also dependent on its decision 
and direction. This situation was reportedly taken advantage of by certain government 
officials who directed aid into areas of political advantage.  
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8.3 Neglect of Local Perspectives 
 
The alleviation of human suffering should be the primary concern of all humanitarian action. 
To know the sufferings of the population humanitarians seek to serve, they must listen. 
Disaster after disaster has demonstrated that the inability to listen has become a trademark of 
humanitarians.177 The Haiti experience confirms this shortcoming.  
 
Immediately after the disaster in Haiti, humanitarian actors found a devastated government 
unable to take charge of the relief efforts178. With no captain in sight, it was a wide-open 
field, anyone who wanted to erect a tent somewhere did just that, or whatever they thought 
necessary. Participants say the assessment of needs was weak, if at all conducted. One could 
hardly blame the humanitarians alone. The situation was dire -- with hundreds of thousands 
buried in the rubble -- humanitarians were racing against time. The situation demanded 
immediate action.   
 
Despite an active Haitian civil society, UN agencies and other international actors parachuted 
into Haiti with their own ideas about what needed to be done. They marginalized these key 
local voices that knew the local terrain better and could have been vital allies. Researchers 
argue that aid workers have an unconstructive and limited way to interact with local 
populations. This limited interaction according to them, can lead to distorted views of their 
needs.179 While different actors conducted their individual needs assessments from scratch, 
the majority of them neglected the analysis of local context, local capacities and constraints to 
response.180, Failure to assess the needs on the ground results in distributing aid 
inappropriately.181 
 
A paternalistic streak in the institute of humanitarianism could help explain why 
humanitarians do not listen.  The whole doctrine of institutionalized care is based on the 	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explicit presumption that “victims” are too helpless to dig themselves out of their troubles 
and need to be rescued by outside Samaritans. The paternalistic attitude creates a gap between 
what recipients feel they need and what humanitarians feel their recipients need. Grunewald 
and Binder argue that the local population was mostly excluded from organizing relief 
efforts, because humanitarians often saw the Haitians as victims.182 
 
A clear example of this is MINUSTAH’s ascertainment that the rule of law is Haiti’s number 
one need. This is despite a number of researches including this one, concluding that Haitians 
consider jobs their gravest need.183  Participants rationalize this as Haitians not understanding 
how relevant the rule of law is to their plight. It is beyond question that the rule of law is an 
important concept. It is necessary to upholding peace and creating the framework for societal 
living in a democratic state. But without the buy-in of the local people, such lofty ideas will 
always fail, as they will be perceived as imposed by exterior forces. Recipients must be 
accorded the dignity to be heard.  
 
Why don’t humanitarians want to do better? Literature review and results from Haiti go 
conform in observing that accountability in humanitarianism works better upward the 
humanitarian chain than downward i.e. humanitarian actors feel more accountable to their 
donors than to their recipients. This fact clearly distills from the research in Haiti. While aid 
agencies like to assert that their work is based on empowering their recipients, scholars argue 
that they rather tend to impose strategies on their own terms.184 Power is an exceptionally 
complicated part of humanitarianism. It underlies the humanitarian idea and finds expression 
in terms like alleviating suffering and providing aid and relief.  While humanitarians are 
quick to feel victimized by donors they are not attuned to their own victimization of the local 
population.  
 
Why don’t local populations, such as those in Haiti, challenge this? Local populations are 
often deeply entrenched in the dynamics of dependence of foreign help. The paternalistic 	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attitude of humanitarians, who think recipients need to be assisted the way they find 
appropriate, is mirrored with an inferiority complex in the recipients. Too little focus on 
empowerment of-and collaboration with the local population and instead focus can result in 
their muting and stronger dependency. 
 
Every emergency context has its own dynamics. Only through understanding of the local 
context and empathy with the population can ultimately lead to successful humanitarian 
actions. Humanitarianism should be built on a foundation of mutual respect. The 
humanitarian idea is born out of the wish inherent to humanity, to help others in need and 
therefore incorporates a certain paternalistic element. Yet given the rise in attacks against 
humanitarians in the past decades, it is necessary to rethink this attitude and start considering 
recipients as politically mature and able to decide for themselves in what way they want to be 
assisted. Empathy and inclusion of the local population is likely to lower the risk for 
humanitarian actors to become targets themselves.185 
 
 
8.4 Lack of coordination 
 
A recurrent theme throughout the research is the lack of coordination among the plethora of 
humanitarian actors in Haiti, resulting in duplication and waste. Picture close to a thousand 
organizations running around Port-au-Prince trying to stake a claim in the chaos that was 
Haiti soon after the earthquake. The UN, which is supposed to serve as the premier 
multilateral mechanism to facilitate the response of all those stakeholders, had its own 16 
specialized agencies and an entire peacekeeping operation with which to content.  
 
The UN office in charge of coordinating humanitarian affairs, OCHA, was criticized, by 
those surveyed, as a failure; it was dubbed “Organized Chaos in Haiti”.  Coordination in Haiti 
is conducted via a cluster system. These clusters, headed by OCHA, bring together specialists 
in the same field from all the various humanitarian actors, including NGOs, the Haitian 
Government, UN agencies and other stakeholders. The creation of clusters contributed to the 
swift response, in the initial phase of the crisis. Their continued existence, however, was soon 
resented as an extra layer of bureaucracy by some program staff. Participants lamented that 	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the clusters, coupled by weak management led to confusion, and ultimately bogged down the 
response due to constant conflict. 
 
Creating channels for collaboration is futile, if people are not willing, or trusting enough, to 
work together. The UN is well aware that it needs to be more coherent in its delivery of 
services. The world body launched, in 2006, the “Delivering as One” initiative. Despite 
strong incentives, including funds that can only be accessed as part of the Initiative, takers are 
few. Organizational reforms that involve giving up turf, or authority, will meet resistance. 
Organizations are likely to support changes that enhance their autonomy, resources and size, 
not those that scale them down.186 
 
In this climate of economic hardships, asking people to collaborate is basically asking them to 
give up individual credit for the better good. This in turn implies ceding the unique platform 
upon which they attract funding, as discussed under “Pressure” # 8.2. In a fiercely 
competitive world where being first can mean the difference between the next funding 
installment going to UNESCO versus UNICEF, collaboration is a hard sell. 
 
Whoever the winner may be, the losers will always be the poor men, women and children 
who have their complete trust in humanitarian bodies, such as the UN. Money, time and 
energy are wasted in turf wars. Though on paper the mandates of the UN agencies seemed 
different, in practice they often overlapped. Many undertook efforts in the same areas of 
work. For example, the long-suffering Haitian communities were bombarded with the same 
questions, over and again, because agencies did not share information already gathered. 
These repetitive assessments added no value, wasted money and time. Humanitarian agencies 
on the ground could do their part to help better address the real needs of the recipients by 
cooperating better to minimize the overlap in activities.187 
 
Competition, in the worst case can drive humanitarian agencies to turn into purely business 
oriented propaganda machines, primarily concerned with raising more money by waiving 
their flag into the lens of every camera. The findings of the research suggest that, when 
brought to a head, organizational self-interest and survival will prevail over the humanitarian 	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imperative. The alleviation of human suffering, wherever it may be found, must yield until 
the business concerns of agencies are satisfied.  
 
 
8.5 Blurring of lines between the military and aid agencies 
 
A well-intentioned initiative to better coordinate the UN’s work on the ground, the 
“integrated mission” concept, solved some old problems, but created new ones. The 
integration of the peacekeeping missions with the specialized agencies blurred the lines 
between politics and humanitarianism. The agencies struggled to manage the balance between 
establishing a strategic partnership and staying true to their principles.188 
 
This blurring of lines unfortunately comes at a bigger cost to the humanitarian ideal than to 
the political. This mix humanizes the political branch, which is a positive. Yet it politicizes 
the humanitarian agencies, which can have negative results on their image.  
This unholy union has some tangible benefits to aid workers. In short-term, security forces 
allow humanitarians much needed access to high-risk areas.  
 
In Haiti, the UN stabilization mission provided substantial logistical support and security to 
humanitarians. Agency staff, and other NGOs, lived and worked out of the secure 
MINUSTAH base. The security forces of MINUSTAH also escorted aid workers to reach 
unsafe parts of the country. It is worth noting that MINUSTAH, had been present in Haiti six 
years before the earthquake and advert of many humanitarian workers. The UN humanitarian 
workers, for better or worse, inherited the perceptions Haitians had of the military. 
Participants lamented that this association with the military made it difficult for the Haitian 
population to view them as neutral and independent.  
 
Though Haiti is not a conflict state, the blurring of lines had serious consequences. The 
cholera outbreak, attributed to the UN (see # 8.6), hampered the humanitarian’s ability to 
provide relief due to the anger and soured relations with the local population. Participants 
stated that their activities were crippled at the height of the tension because Haitians could not 	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differentiate between the various branches of the UN. Rightly so, to ordinary people around 
the world, the UN is one entity. The intricate details of the Security Council versus the 
General Assembly, specialized agencies versus peacekeeping missions, are not even 
understood by some staff within the UN itself, let alone those outside. The population’s anger 
was directed at the UN as a whole.  
 
This blurring of the lines, as also discussed in the literature review, diminishes the 
Humanitarian Space. It fuels hostility towards aid workers. While they gain short-term 
protection, it makes them longer-term soft targets for terrorism. It can also compromise the 
access to certain conflict areas, because they are no longer seen as neutral. 
 
 
8.6 A crisis within a crisis 
 
The UN’s good work has of late been tarnished by a number of controversies, particularly 
due to abuse of power and lack of accountability. Haiti was no exception. In what has come 
to be known as a “crisis with a crisis”. Ten months after the earthquake, there was a cholera 
outbreak that killed 7000 people. The outbreak source was traced to a UN military camp. 
Within a few months, cholera had spread all across the country, leaving a trail of dead bodies 
and much suffering in its wake.  The UN, to this date, has not acknowledged responsibility. 
 
Perhaps, there is no greater tragedy in the industry of care, than when those entrusted with the 
duty to save and protect lives become violators. While the cholera case was a case of 
negligence rather than intentional harm, the lack of accountability displayed by the United 
Nations added insult to injury. Obvious errors tend to be concealed or explained away, rather 
than offering an outright admittance. 
 
Needless to say, angry Haitian crowds rioted on the streets throwing dead bodies over the 
UN’s compound and demanding its ouster from their country. At the time of writing, affected 
Haitians, represented by the Institute for Justice and Democracy, filed a lawsuit against the 
UN seeking compensation for cholera victims. Failure to admit responsibility and respond in 
good time, did not only sour relations with the Haitian population, it also soured UN relations 
with other international humanitarian organizations who were caught in the crossfire.  
Unfortunately, cholera was not the only controversy the UN suffered in Haiti.  
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Videos widely circulated on the internet, and were picked up by leading news sources, of UN 
peacekeepers allegedly sodomizing a young Haitian man. In the video, the alleged 
peacekeepers are seen laughing and taunting their defenseless victim. MINUSTAH’s 
response, was a bland one “We take the case very seriously and are currently 
investigating”.189   
 
Humanitarians have the obligation to assure protection and assistance.190 Not unique to Haiti, 
a recent study by the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, the first international self-
regulatory body of the humanitarian sector, found proof for sexual abuse of recipients by aid 
workers in several countries. The report notes five separate incidents for Haiti. All of them 
happened in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake.  In one example an aid worker asked 
a girl, whose tent had been washed away by heavy rains, for sex in exchange for a 
replacement tent.191  
 
The Organization also faced accusations of not being effective in relocating people made 
homeless by the earthquake who lived in squalid conditions in camps. 
 
The cholera outbreak was a disaster for the UN. It chipped away much of its credibility 
among the Haitian population. When problem solvers become problem creators, the local 
population will lose confidence in them. Humanitarians must treat with care the trust 
accorded them. Humanitarianism without accountability towards their recipients, becomes 
open to abuse. It becomes a farce, useful, at most, for joining the ranks of unaccountable local 
politics, in place in countries that need support to escape their cruel lot. 
 
If the UN hopes to maintain its place as a trusted and credible force of good, it should own up 
to its mistakes and immediately take steps to address them. It must take action to reign in its 
excesses. Humanitarianism is as much about the implementation of programs, as it is about 
being a role model.  Workers in countries afflicted by disasters and crises have the unique 	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possibility to be a force of change for the better. They have a moral obligation to protect 
vulnerable people, not to abuse their power. 
 
 
8.7 Incompetence of humanitarian workers 
 
Humanitarian intervention is as good as its implementers. Disasters hit unannounced. Over 
night, the UN must deploy thousands of workers to save lives and at times within 24 hours. 
Quick deployment, however, does not necessarily translate into quality staff.192 
Emergencies certainly attract veterans of the humanitarian response who are ready and 
willing to do good work. But, they are also prone to attracting opportunistic risk takers and 
inexperienced staff due to the time-pressured recruitment.193  
 
For UN staff, deployment to countries undergoing an emergency (classified as hardship duty 
stations), mean significantly higher compensation. Benefits, including hazard payments, can 
be an incentive for some staff members to engage in disaster relief work for a limited amount 
of time.194 Time in a hardship duty station is also a short cut to a promotion and sometimes a 
requirement for moving up the career ladder.  
 
As might be expected with such a mix of motives and talents, staff incompetence was a 
recurrent theme in the reported impediments to the humanitarian principles. Unmotivated and 
incompetent staff can seriously compromise the success of humanitarian missions. The 
results from Haiti, mirror findings from other disasters, such as the 2006 Tsunami in Asia195, 
which found that incompetent and inexperienced workers were more vulnerable to making 
blunders and further complicating the coordination of relief efforts.  
 
Poor hiring practices also account for staff incompetence. For example: “excessive turnover, 
partly due to short-term contracting but also attrition (health-induced, for example, leading to 
gaps due to inadequate back-up staff); insufficient competent staff; and a predominance of 	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inappropriate ‘Western’ profiles, with poor language skills and an inadequate understanding 
of context and culture.”196  
 
French is the international language spoken in Haiti; it is prerequisite for collaborating with 
the government and for communicating with the local population. Yet the UN deployed 
people who did not speak a word of French; participants claim that soon after the earthquake, 
about half the UN staff was non-French speaking. Key meetings in the initial response phase 
were held in English, sideling local participants. Language problems impeded relief work, 
with aid workers living in their own bubble. The local population better accepts humanitarian 
workers who speak the local language.197  
 
The factor of inexperienced international and national staff as an impediment to relief 
efforts198 was aggravated by Haiti’s geographical location. Only a convenient four-hour flight 
from New York City, it is easily accessible for staff already working with the UN at 
headquarters, eager to spice up their resumes with an emergency experience. 
 
The biggest frustration for the participants was what they called the ineffectiveness of some 
senior managers; managerial decisions did not always reflect an understanding of emergency 
relief activities, jeopardizing their success. Participants accused some senior managers of 
impartiality in allocating resources to certain activities. 
 
The condescending attitude of some UN staff towards the local population also created 
problems. This is prevalent among workers who are not driven by a desire to alleviate human 
suffering, but by self-interest. They were reported to be uncommitted to the humanitarian 
imperative. While career advancement or monetary compensation is not evil in itself, people 
engaging in humanitarian work should also be committed to service. The humanitarian ideal 
has, however, been taken advantage of by some of the people who are supposed to guard and 
preserve it. Engaging in humanitarianism, for some, has purely become a bid for prestige and 
material gain. 
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This recipe for disaster goes unmitigated because, despite the UN mandating the 
humanitarian principles by General Assembly resolution, the fact is few humanitarian staff 
are aware of the principles that they are expected to uphold. Even the veteran humanitarian 
staff interviewed were, for the most part, not formally trained or informed about the 
principles; they eventually learned of them through various avenues.  
 
The same holds true for the author who was deployed to two humanitarian missions. On the 
ground, no one talks about the principles. There are no formal mechanisms for educating staff 
on the need to be neutral, impartial and independent. There are no checks and balances to 
ensure the principles are applied; it is left up to the individual’s on intuition to know that they 
exist and the individual’s conscience to apply them. 
 
 
8.8 Poor capacity of Haitian Government 
 
Haiti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere, already had a weak government before 
the earthquake. The earthquake further weakened vital mechanisms of the government. In 
most humanitarian operations, the government’s guidance is key to coordinating relief efforts. 
A government articulating clear and measurable goals, coupled with mechanisms ensuring 
accountability, could have contributed to an efficient and quality recovery process. The 
Haitian government, due to its weakened state, could not fulfill this critical role.  
 
Participants state that the lack of government leadership hindered the channeling of the relief 
into the right directions, which resulted in chaos. With the right guidance, the combined 
force, especially of many small NGOs, could have been utilized to engage civil society in 
day-to-day relief and recovery activities. This would have been a valuable social asset, 
contributing to the reconstruction of the country. The government, which had to be consulted 
for approval of humanitarian actions, was not able to constructively assist in the planning of 
relief efforts. The research demonstrates that relief actors would have wished for a stronger 
role of the government.  
 
At the same time, the research shows that UN agencies ere also guilty of sidelining the 
government. Many aid actors took advantage of the weak governmental oversight. They were 
rampant, initiating activities that were not always necessary. The aid agencies justified their 
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free reign by arguing that the capacities of the ministries, important for the planning of relief 
activities, were severely understaffed and they had to take charge.  
 
The chaos in the country and the lack of accountability within the government gave room to 
widespread corruption. Exploitative forces in the humanitarian community and the 
government found a marriage of convenience, in direct violation of the basic code of conduct 
for aid workers and the humanitarian principles.  
 
Corruption obstructed the response to urgent needs. It jeopardized the lives of people by often 
slowing down important decision-making processes, as someone hands had to be greased 
before they could green light projects. The author recalls a plane ride into Port-au-Prince 
from Miami, where a Haitian government official sitting next to him and discussing the 
personal profit he gained in the aftermath, said, “The earthquake is the best thing that could 
have happened to Haiti.”  
 
Badly needed relief goods were delayed in the ports of entry. Import tax demands on donated 
goods could, arbitrarily, be set as high as 100 percent of the good’s value. In addition, 
substantial amounts of relief money were diverted into projects directly benefiting 
government officials. Navigating these challenges is daunting for many humanitarians and 
puts them in unexpected circumstances that can test the humanitarian imperative and make it 
difficult to remain independent. 
 
Abiding by the humanitarian principles in emergency situations can put aid workers in 
situations of moral conflict, when neglecting them might save lives. Cutting deals with the 
devil sometimes might seem to be the only way to provide assistance. Yet when 
humanitarians yield to corrupted demands by officials it will be counter-productive in the 
long run. Giving in does not appease corruption; it only results in more and more demands. 
Corrupt patterns that further enrich the elite of poor countries offer no solution for the 
problems of the poor. Long-term solutions, such as focusing on education and economic 
opportunities, are urgently needed.  
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8.9 The Emergency Context  
 
The success of the humanitarian mission is uncertain from the start. Emergencies are 
characterized by chaos, refugees seeking shelter, famine, disease outbreak, widespread death 
and suffering. Essentially, some of the toughest challenges anyone could face. Rieff 
eloquently states that, “…humanitarianism is by definition an emblem of failure, not 
success.”199 
 
When the disaster strikes in a desperately poor country such as Haiti, the challenge is 
magnified by the lack of an emergency response system, lack of infrastructure and resources. 
With thousands of people buried in the rubble and racing against time, the finer details of the 
humanitarian principles are the last consideration. If a shovel to dig out a child bears the 
American flag, or indeed that of a belligerent party, no one weighs this lifesaver against the 
principle of neutrality. In an emergency you do what needs to be done by any means 
necessary. For the same reason, humanitarians blurred the lines by accepting military escorts 
to access high-risk zones.  
 
Humanitarian workers can never be absolutely prepared for all eventualities of exceptional 
circumstances of emergencies. The bigger the emergency, the bigger the challenges involved 
and the greater the number of competing needs. The earthquake in Haiti is arguably the 
gravest disaster of the past decade. The immediate needs never run dry. Humanitarians are 
simply overwhelmed and they will never succeed at addressing all human suffering wherever 
it may be found.  
 
Participants cited, as a major failure of the UN response, the fact that, a year after the 
earthquake, thousands of people were still living in camps. Only a few have a prospect of 
moving anywhere else in the near future. Resettlement programs in many cases only move 
families from tents to new camps at the outskirts of town, where they live in small plywood 
shelters. These sites, far off from economic opportunities in the city and schools, promise to 
be the future slums of Port-au-Prince if humanitarian actors and the government do not work 
together on viable solutions for the future. 
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For the UN, the situation in post earthquake Haiti was one of the most challenging. The 
earthquake killed 102 staff members; the highest staff casualty in the history of the UN. It 
decimated its Headquarters in Haiti and damaged other vital facilities. Yet as wounded as the 
UN was, it was still expected to rise from the rubble and play its role. Against all these odds, 
the UN agencies, with re-enforcements coming in from around the world, succeeded in 
responding to the immediate needs of the people.   
Participants believed, one of the UN’s greatest successes in Haiti was that it raised money 
quickly to immediately respond to the most pressing needs of the people. Participants further 
commended the UN’s maintenance of peace and security and especially the capacity building 
of the Haitian government 
Despite its many challenges, despite the compromising of the humanitarian principles the UN 
did alleviate human suffering in Haiti. Could it have done better? Yes. Were the humanitarian 
principles observed throughout the response? Sometimes.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
CONCLUSION 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“The question facing agencies is not whether to be political, but how.”200 	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The argument in favor of the humanitarian principles is undeniable; the principles are 
powerful ideals worth chasing. The reality on the ground is far more complex.  
Humanitarians walk a constant tight rope of multiple -- and often conflicting -- 
accountabilities to donors, organizational mandates, recipients and public opinion. From the 
battlefields of Solferino, what began as a simple act of compassion has grown into a gigantic 
international government and multi-billion dollar empire. It is increasingly hierarchical and 
institutionalized with all the dynamics of power 201.  
 
At the outset, the thesis sought to investigate the hypothesis stating that: “If the humanitarian 
principles are idealistic, then UN agencies will face considerable limitations practicing 
them.” Based on the results of the research, the author concludes that indeed the core 
humanitarian principles cannot be practiced as preached. On the ground, humanitarian 
workers face considerable limitations and tough choices. Confronted by the myriad of 
dilemmas inevitable in the emergency context, there are too few incentives to sustain the 
humanitarian principles, yet too many disincentives. There is no accountability mechanism to 
enforce the principles; they are voluntary. While the principles are noble, their custodians are 
human beings complete with their own limitations. Without a firm system to reward those 
who uphold the principles, or penalize those who violate them, these ideals are at the mercy 
of more powerful forces. They are open to abuse and manipulation. 
 
The second hypothesis sought to prove that: “If UN agencies seek to alleviate human 
suffering, then they are more likely to do so when this also advances their self-interest”. 
Indeed, while UN agencies want to alleviate human suffering, they also want to be seen to be 
doing good work and doing it better than other agencies, and thereby attract donor 
confidence. The global economic meltdown has intensified this organizational survival 
instinct. The crisis is forcing further restructuring with its call to “Do more with less”. 
Despite the incentives to do away with duplication and waste, cooperation for the greater 
good is often hindered by competition, protection of territory and conflicting policies.  
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The third hypothesis, sought to prove that: “If UN agencies remain neutral, impartial and 
independent, then they do so only when feasible and strategic.” The data was leaning towards 
the confirmation of the hypothesis. The conundrum is that the principles were designed to 
secure a Humanitarian Space that is apolitical, yet they must be applied in a very much 
political context. Whenever politics and principle clash, politics will prevail. Holding on to 
the notion that humanitarianism is independent of these external forces is futile. The sooner 
aid workers face up to this fact, the better prepared they will be to at least engage in good 
politics. This is not to suggest that the principles no longer have a place.  
 
The humanitarian principles are needed more than ever before. It is precisely in these times of 
tremendous pressure that humanitarianism need standards to ensure it does not shift too far 
from its roots. Rather, the author argues that principles should not be clung onto as an end in 
themselves. Neutrality, for instance, has proved to be the most controversial of the principles.  
 
Will humanitarians choose, in the name of neutrality, to remain silent in the face of grave 
human rights abuses? Is it their duty to bear witness and condemn those that perpetrate 
atrocities against the defenseless communities they serve? As the thesis demonstrated, the 
answers are not straightforward. Yet humanitarian actors cannot afford to brush aside these 
valid questions. They must actively influence the discourse.  
 
To conclude, the principles should serve humanitarians, rather than the reverse. Principles 
should facilitate the ability to alleviate the suffering of the millions of women children and 
men, around the world who have placed their trust in organizations such as the United 
Nations. Humanitarianism is about people first. When the principles jeopardize this          
non-negotiable hallmark of humanitarianism, aid workers must have the integrity, moral 
backbone and wisdom to choose people. If this means renegotiating the principles, in the 
political context of each individual emergency, this is a reality humanitarians must embrace. 
Aid workers must therefore cultivate the acumen to humanize politics, or risk that external 
forces will forever politicize humanitarianism.  
 
 
*** 
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APPENDIX	  
	  
	  
I. Research Survey on the UN Humanitarian Response in Haiti  
	  
	  	  
According	  to	  UN	  Guidelines,	  there	  are	  four	  principles	  that	  provide	  the	  foundation	  
for	  humanitarian	  action.	  Compliance	  with	  these	  principles	  is	  essential:	  	  	  
Humanity:	  Human	  suffering	  must	  be	  addressed	  wherever	  it	  may	  be	  found;	  this	  is	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  that	  humanitarian	  efforts	  must	  put	  the	  needs	  of	  people	  first.	  	  	  
Neutrality:	  humanitarian	  actors	  must	  not	  take	  sides	  in	  hostilities,	  or	  engage	  in	  controversies	  of	  a	  political,	  racial,	  religious	  or	  ideological	  nature.	  
	  
Impartiality:	  Humanitarian	  assistance	  must	  be	  delivered	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  need	  alone,	  giving	  priority	  to	  the	  most	  urgent	  cases	  of	  distress	  without	  discriminating	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  nationality,	  race,	  gender,	  religious	  belief,	  class	  or	  political	  opinions.	  
 
Operational independence: Humanitarian action must be autonomous; and implementation 
must be independent from the political, economic or military objectives.  
 
	  
	  
	  
In	  answering	  the	  questionnaire,	  please	  refer	  to	  the	  period	  between	  January	  to	  
December	  2010	  (the	  first	  year	  since	  the	  earthquake).	  Thank	  you	  for	  participating:	  
 
 
1) What are the main goals of your agency in post-earthquake Haiti? 
 
 
2) For the UN, what are the major challenges of operating in a high profile disaster 
where there are many international humanitarian actors involved, such as in Haiti? 
 
 
3) What in your view are the three primary concerns motivating the international 
humanitarian agencies that are operating in Haiti post the earthquake? 
 
 
4) In theory, four fundamental principles guide humanitarian work (humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and operational independence). In practice, do you find that humanitarian 
agencies abide by these core principles? 
 
Yes  No  Sometimes 
 
5) What makes it difficult to practice the principle of humanity/putting people first? 
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6) What makes it difficult to practice the principles of neutrality and impartiality? 
 
 
7) What makes it difficult to practice the principle of operational independence? 
 
 
8) In practice, what is strongest in driving the humanitarian agenda: The needs of the 
people affected, Donors, Government of Haiti, or Organizational Interests of 
humanitarian agencies? Please rank from most influential to least influential: 
 
A.   
B.   
C.   
D. 
 
 
9) The one-year report by MINUSTAH says the most pressing need in Haiti, post the 
earthquake, is securing the rule of law (police/ courts/judiciary). Do you agree? 
 
 
10) Would the people of Haiti agree that the rule of law is their most pressing need? 
  
 
11) What in your view are the top three pressing needs in Haiti? 
 
 
12) What were the top three successes of the UN response to the disaster in Haiti? 
 
 
13) What are the three primary shortcomings of the UN response to the disaster in Haiti? 
 
 
14) How can the UN better serve the needs of people in Haiti? 
 
 
15) Do you have any additional comments? 	  	  *** 	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II. ABSTRACT DEUTSCH 
 
Das Ziel dieser Diplomarbeit war es zu untersuchen, wie schwierig es ist, die humanitären 
Prinzipien von Humanität, Neutralität und operationeller Unabhängigkeit zu befolgen. Die 
Prinzipien dienen als Verhaltensgrundregeln für humanitäre Akteure und sind somit eine 
essentielle Komponente humanitärer Einsätze. Die Prinzipien haben auch die pragmatische 
Funktion, humanitäre Akteure von politischen Akteuren zu unterscheiden. Die humanitären 
Prinzipien wurden etabliert, um einen apolitischen “Humanitarian Space”, eine humanitäre 
Sphäre, frei von politischen Einflüssen, zu garantieren. Ihre Widersprüchlichkeit liegt darin, 
dass sie dennoch in einem politischen Kontext angewendet werden 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit fokussiert sich auf den Zeitraum im ersten Jahr nach dem Erbeben in 
Haiti 2010.  Sie erforscht die Grenzen der Prinzipien und versucht die Motivationen der 
humanitären Agenda im Land zu ergründen. Zu Forschungszwecken, wurden Interviews mit 
40 Mitarbeitern der Vereinten Nationen, die direkt an der Krisenhilfe nach dem Erbeben 
beteiligt waren, durchgeführt. 
 
Der Autor resümiert, dass die humanitären Prinzipien nicht so befolgt werden können, wie sie 
gepredigt werden. Die Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass die Agenturen der Vereinten 
Nationen menschlichem Leid Abhilfe schaffen wollen. Wie dem auch sei, zumindest im 
gleichen Ausmaß sind ihnen ihre institutionellen Interessen ein Anliegen. Humanitäre 
Organisationen folgen den Prinzipien, wenn es in ihrem besten Interesse ist. Sie befinden sich 
in einem ständigen Balanceakt, zwischen den Verantwortlichkeiten gegenüber ihren 
Geldgebern, ihren institutionellen Interessen, und den Interessen der lokalen Bevölkerung. In 
Konfrontation mit der komplexen Realität in Katastrophengebieten, gibt es zu wenige 
Anreize die humanitären Prinzipien zu Befolgen, und zu viele Argumente für deren 
Ignorierung. 
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